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I.

INTRODUCTION

At the beginning of The Nature ofthe JudicialProcess,Benjamin Cardozo
describes the difficulty and unease with which judges confront the question:
"What is it that I do when I decide a case?"' Nearly eight decades later, judges
and legal scholars find themselves no closer to a coherent and believable
characterization of the judicial process. Moreover, there is no consensus as to
what judges shouldbe doing. The emergence of new strains of legal theory in
recent decades has added intensity and new vocabularies to jurisprudential
debates, but has failed to generate an adequate aspirational model for judging.
The result is something of a jurisprudential identity crisis. Should judges be
umpires, henchmen, priests, creative writers, oracles, gardeners, logicians, or

*Bigelow Teaching Fellow and Lecturer in Law, University of Chicago Law School.
I would like to thank the University of Virginia Law School for providing me with a Scholar-inResidence position during the 1998-99 academic year, which facilitated the writing of this essay.
1. BENJAMIN N. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 10 (1921).
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something else entirely?2 Should they aspire to Herculean wisdom,
empathetically participate in the problems of the litigants before them, or settle
for ironically tailoring the emperor's new clothes?3 These questions are
important ones. The way in which the judicial function is conceptualized has
overarching implications for law and legal theory, with society-wide
repercussions. 4 Yet such questions cannot be meaningfully tackled without an
appreciation of the jurisprudential threats that judges themselves perceive as
circumscribing their work. In other words, before deciding whatjudges ought
to become, it is worth considering what they are most afraid of becoming.
Only by locating the outer boundaries of legitimate judicial action can the
terrain that lies within be meaningfully surveyed.
I begin by analyzing two vivid and recurrent metaphorical images which
have been used repeatedly injudicial opinions to express what judging should
not be. The first metaphor is that of the monster, most expansively presented
in Justice Scalia's concurrence in Lamb's Chapelv. Center Moriches Union
Free School District.5 The second metaphor is that of the machine, perhaps
nowhere more eloquently raised and rejected than in Justice Frankfurter's
majority opinion in Rochin v. California.6 These two pejorative images-the
monster and the machine-together represent precisely what is most disturbing

2. See, e.g., id. at 19 (quoting Blackstone's characterization of judges as "living
oracle[s] of the law"); id. at 98-99 (discussing judge's role in pruning dysfiinctional judicial
doctrines); RONALDDWORKiN, AMATEROFPRINCIPLE 158-59 (1985) (analogizing "[d]eciding
hard cases at law" to the creation of a "chain novel," where a different author contributes each
successive chapter); JOSEPH VINING, THE AUTHORITATIVE AND THE AUTHORITAIAN 190-91
(1986) (comparing judges to priests); Philip Soper, Metaphors andModels ofLaw: The Judge
asPriest,75 MICH.L.REv. 1196, 1199 (1977) (discussing judges as henchmen, logicians, game
players, and priests).
3. See RONALD DWORKiN, LAw's EMPIRE 239 (1986) (introducing Hercules, "an
imaginary judge ofsuperhuman intellectual power and patience who accepts law as integrity");
Louis MICHAEL SEIDMAN & MARK V. TUSHNET, REMNANTS OF BELIEF:

CONTEMPORARY

CONSTITUTIONAL IssuEs 200 (1996) (using the metaphor of the emperor's new clothes to
describe "the emptiness ofconstitutional [law] arguments"); ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE
23 (1997) (suggesting traditional notions ofjustice should be supplemented with empathy).
4. The power of metaphor to shape thought in law, as well as in other disciplines, has
been well recognized. See, e.g., MILNERS. BALL, LYING DOWN TOGETHER: LAw, METAPHOR, AND
THEOLOGY 22 (1985) (asserting that "metaphor is instrumental in shaping reality"); HAlo
BOSMAJIAN, METAPHOR AND REASON IN JUDICIAL OPINIONS 7 (1992) (describing how the
"importance of the metaphor in legal discourse... began to be recognized and explored by a few
legal scholars in the 1980s"); DENNIS R. KLINCK, THE WORD OF THE LAw 335-70 (1992)
(discussing "the contemporary upsurge of interest in metaphor" and its relation to law); James
E. Murray, UnderstandingLaw as Metaphor, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 714 (1984) (discussing "the
analogical, metaphorical thinking which an increasing number of legal scholars are proposing
as foundational to law"); Steven L. Winter, TranscendentalNonsense, MetaphoricReasoning,
and the CognitiveStakesfor Law, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1105, 1114 (1989) (explaining "the use of
metaphor in constructing a framework for.., a more realistic concept of law"); see generally
GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (1980); ROBERT L. SCHiWARz,
METAPHORS AND ACTION SCHEMES: SOME THEMES IN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY (1997).

5. See 508 U.S. 384,398-99 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also infra Part II.A.
6. See 342 U.S. 165, 171 (1952); see also infra Part II.B.
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and problematic about the work of judging. They correspond to the twin
dangers of runaway discretion and the complete preclusion of discretion, and
find echoes in contemporary debates over the degree to which individual
litigants' narratives should be taken into account in judicial decisions.
Taking these jurisprudential threats as starting points, I consider the
inherent tension between discretionary and rules-based models of judging.
Using examples drawn from current law, including two recent Supreme Court
opinions and the federal sentencing guidelines, I explore the nature of the
debate over these two modes of decisionmaking.7 I contend that a successful
model ofjudging requires a workable synthesis between rules and discretion.
I next examine two alternative formulations of the work of judging that
have gained currency with judges and scholars and which seem to promise an
effective assimilation of rules and discretion.8 The first of these, judging as
balancing, has become the dominant approach in judicial opinions and offers
the semblance of rationality, fairness, and exactitude. Yet the metaphor does
not accurately describe what judges do in deciding a case, and the heuristic of
the scales offers no deterninacy given the fact that the weights and their
weighings lie in the sole discretion of the judge. Nor does balancing provide a
principled way of handling pre-existing rules-they can simply be placed on
the scales like anything else and outweighed whenever the judge wishes them
to be.
The second vision ofjudging I consider is Ronald Dworkin's image of the
judge as a participant in the writing of a "chain novel."9 While on the surface
such an approach might seem to mediate well between the demands of rules
and the particularistic requirements of the case at hand, in reality it could not
do so. Either the judge would be bound to maintain the internal consistency of
the piece at all costs (and without regard to the real-world implications for the
litigants before her), or thejudge would creatively overwrite the past narrative
to make room for her own idiosyncratic preferences. In neither case would the
tension between rules and discretion be appropriately mediated.
I conclude by sketching out how the judicial function might be
meaningfully reconceptualized. I suggest that any appropriate view ofjudging
must be closely tied to notions ofpragmatism and must blend discretionary and
rules-based elements. The metaphoric formulation that fits best with such a
pragmatic approach, I argue, is that of the judge as a builder, arriving at a
partially constructedjob site with a well-stocked toolbox and a rather fuzzy and
incomplete set of blueprints. She cannot ignore the existing structures any more
than she can ignore the ambiguous dictates of the blueprints, yet she can
interpret the plans intelligently and tear down, rebuild, patch up, or chip away
as necessary.

7. See infra Part III.A.
8. See infra Part III.B.1-2.
9. DWoRKIN, supra note 2, at 158-59; see also infra Part II.B.2.
10. See infra Part IV.
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II. JURISPRUDENTIAL THREATS
A.

The Monster

In his Lamb's Chapel concurrence, Justice Scalia likens the selectivelyapplied "Lemon test"" of Establishment Clause jurisprudence to "some ghoul
in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles
abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried."' 2 Although reliably spooky,
the monster is also quite obedient and pliant:
It is there to scare us (and our audience) when we wish it to
do so, but we can command it to return to the tomb at will.
When we wish to strike down a practice it forbids, we invoke
it; when we wish to uphold a practice it forbids, we ignore it
entirely. . . .Such a docile and useful monster is worth
keeping around, at least in a somnolent state; one never
knows when one might need him.'3
Scalia's depiction of the ghoul is, of course, highly comical; he marvels at its
continued survival despite the fact that "no fewer than five of the currently
sitting Justices have, in their own opinions, personally driven pencils through
the creature's heart."' 4 Yet behind the comedy lurks a serious point about the
dangers of judicially created doctrines and the discretionary manner in which
they are applied.
The criticism leveled at the Lemon test could be applied with equal force
to scores of other haphazardly formed and inconsistently applied judicial
creations, suggesting that Scalia's monster is but a single specimen of a rather
robust species. Such judicially created monsters and their incorporeal
brethren-ghosts-have repeatedly haunted jurisprudence, with a number of
sightings reported by Supreme Court justices. For example, in Hensley v.
Eckerhart, Justice Brennan lamented the fact that 42 U.S.C. § 1988'" had
metamorphosed into "a vast body of artificial, judge-made doctrine, with its
own arcane procedures, which like a Frankenstein's monster meanders its wellintentioned way through the legal landscape leaving waste and confusion (not

11. The Court enunciated a three-prong test in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,
612-13 (1971) to determine whether an establishment of religion in violation of the First
Amendment had occurred.
12. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398
(1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
13. Id. at 399 (citations omitted).
14. Id. at 398.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1994).
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to mention circuit splits) in its wake."16 Accusing the majority of creating a

monster (or conjuring up a ghost) is a time-honored rhetorical device. Indeed,
the use of the monster image seems to be a potent manifestation of the
legitimating and power-checking function of the dissent. 7
The monster and ghost metaphors correspond to a particular set of
jurisprudential dangers that are worth unpacking. First, monsters and ghosts
are not "real" in the sense that they govern their own destinies or have
meaningful lives or goals of their own." They are by-products of someone
else's creative energies, parasites and predators rather than bona fide members
of a hereditary line. A monster is a creature cobbled together from incongruent
bits and pieces-something fundamentally illegitimate. A ghost carries the
slightly different connotation of that which has lost all vitality, resonance, and
relevance, but which refuses to obey the natural order of things by departing
from the realm of the living. Both images contrast sharply with that of a vital,
thriving legal doctrine that carries with it a pedigree or "title deed" attesting to

16. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,455 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); see also Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220,
248 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[L]ike a ghost reluctant
to accept its eternal rest, the 'colorable argument' surfaced again."); Dawson Chemical Co. v.
Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 198 (1980) ("[The ghost of the expansive contributory
infringement era continued to haunt the courts."); FHA v. The Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84,9192 (1958) ("Invocation ofthe Due Process Clause to protect the rights asserted here would make
the ghost of Lochner v. New York... walk again."); Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226,
244 (1945) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) ("Once again the ghost of 'unitary domicil' returns on its
perpetual round, in the guise of 'jurisdictional fact,' to upset judgments, marriages, divorces,
undermine the relations founded upon them, and make this Court the unwilling and uncertain
arbiter between the concededly valid laws and decrees of sister states."); Fann v. McGuffey, 534
S.W.2d 770,786 (Ky. 1975) (Steinberg, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe encroachment of implied consent
into our judicial philosophy is a monster, so great that its disastrous effect is unpredictable.");
Plumley v. Klein, 199 N.W. 2d 169,173 (Mich. 1972) (Black, J., dissenting) ("I cannothold still
before this latest judicial monster."); Commonwealth v. Watlington, 420 A.2d 431, 435 (Pa.
1980) (Flaherty, J., dissenting) ("It is time for the Court to realize that we have inadvertently
created a monster ofinefficiency and judicial wastefulness in ourpast interpretations ofthe [Post
Conviction Hearing Act]."); McCormick v. Stowe Lumber Co., 356 S.W.2d 450,462 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (Hughes, J., dissenting) ("[The majority] creates ajudicial monster
from whose clutches there is no escape."); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE
9 (1993) (stating that judicial application of "the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions .... roams about constitutional law like Banquo's ghost, invoked in some cases, but
not in others."); cf. In re The Western Maid, 257 U.S. 419, 433 (1922) (Holmes, J.) ("Legal
obligations that exist but cannot be enforced are ghosts that are seen in the law but that are
elusive to the grasp.").
17. See KARLN. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMONLAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 26
(1960) ("[Tihe dissent and its possibility press toward reckonability of result.").
18. In this respect, they bear some superficial resemblance to the jurisprudential
metaphor of the judge as "henchman," an image criticized by H. L. A. Hart. See Soper, supra
note 2, at 1199 (citing H. L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAv 19 (1961)). Yet unlike a judicial
henchman applying coercive force to carry out the will of a sovereign, these monsters and ghosts
are created by, and take their orders from, the judges themselves.
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its genealogy and heritage.' 9 Moreover, both monsters and ghosts are
terrifyingly powerful beings that can threaten despite their marginal status.
Scalia's monster may be "docile and useful" 0 for the justices' purposes, but
litigants will likely find it to be neither. Worse, monsters and ghosts operate
outside of the laws of nature; they are not animals that can be observed or
understood. The implication is clear: It is pointless for lawyers to attempt a
behavioral study of such incorporeal beings or to attribute rationality to their
lurching movements.
That the monster metaphor should be used to indict judicial doctrines
fashioned entirely with words is not surprising. The notion of the monster is
deeply rooted in language, as David Williams explains: "Several ancient
teratological legends trace the appearance of the monster in the world to the
moment of the collapse of the Tower of Babel and suggest a causal relation
between the two events.""1 Thus, the monster represents the failure of words,
the misshapen product of an arrogant attempt to achieve unity through
language.' Conversely, ghosts represent the haunting afterimage of that which
was once meaningful, but has lost all meaning and vitality. Significantly, it is
only in the context of organic life-here, the living, evolving life of the
law-that monsters and ghosts emerge as aberrations, misbegotten creatures
threatening the natural order.
What is compelling and apt about Scalia's image of the monster is that it
portrays an utterly manipulable, yet fully dangerous creature. The fact that the
beast canbe killed or commandedby the Court provides little solace to litigants
forced to endure its unpredictable rampages. Nor are the repeated burials really
very comical when one considers the resources that are wasted as litigants try
to make sense of the resulting "geometry of crooked lines and wavering
shapes."' Such a judicial creature is nothing more than judicial discretion in
a formidable shape; unseen hands determine its course. Therein lies its true
monstrousness. It is one thing, Scalia seems to suggest, for judges to simply
24
admit that they are reaching whatever result they think best in a given case.
It is quite another to pretend that the result is the work of ajudge-made creature
that can be beckoned or ignored at will.

19. CARDOzo, supra note 1, at 102-03.
20. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 399
(1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
21. DAVID WILLIAMS, DEFORMED DiscouRsE: THE FuNcTION OF THE MONSTER IN
MEDIAEVAL THOUGHT AND LITERATURE 61 (1996).

22. See id. at 61-63.
23. Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 399 (Scalia, J., concurring). Indeed, there is
something almost distasteful about the humorous portrayal of the Court's whimsical rulings,
given their real consequences and incontrovertible coercive power. See generally Robert M.
Cover, Violence andthe Word, 95 YALEL. J. 1601 (1986) (emphasizing the violent and coercive
force oflaw); cf.Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Scorn, 35 WM. &MARYL. REv. 1061,1062
(1994) (criticizing the Supreme Court's use of "scornful humor").
24. Lamb's Chapel,508 U.S. at 398-400 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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It is worthwhile to consider the factors that might impel judges to conjure
up such ghouls. One cannot suppose that any judge intentionally sets out to
create a monster or harbor a ghost; rather, these creatures must be unfortunate
by-products of more defensible judicial tendencies. The explanation lies, I
believe, with the confluence of the desire to constrain the range of judicial
choices and the simultaneous desire to react in a particularistic manner to
individual situations as they arise. It is the combination of these two tendencies
that creates monsters. If judges were to single-mindedly and openly pursue
their own policy preferences in each case, they would create no monsters
(though they might provoke criticism of a different sort). Conversely, the
rulings of judges who view themselves as being constrained from exercising
any choice at all are more likely to invite criticism for being overly mechanical
rather than monstrous. The monster metaphor speaks uniquely to the situation
in which ajudge formulates constraints while retaining (for herself or for other
judges that may follow) the discretion to ignore those constraints when they
produce a result that diverges too far from the decisionmaker's own
preferences.
The desire to constrain the judicial choice-set and streamline
decisionmaking is, I believe, genuine. At first this might seem counterintuitive;
we would expect judges, as rational actors, to desire a broader rather than
narrower field in which to give free rein to personal preferences and to shrink
from anything that would bind their future discretion. Yet this is not always the
case. One reason is economy. Because decisionmaking is very costly (i.e.,
time-consuming, mentally taxing, sometimes even emotionally draining),
shorthand formulations and tools that make use of past investments in
information-gathering and reasoning are efficient.' It makes sense that judges
would develop tools for use in routine situations rather than start from scratch
in each case.
There are other reasons why judges would find it in their interest to cabin
their own discretion, particularly in areas of constitutional law where textual
guidance is quite limited. The legitimacy of the institution demands an
appearance of rationality and consistency, rather than an open resort to
idiosyncratic judicial preferences. Moreover, inconsistency in judicial
decisionmaking generates uncertainty that causes potential litigants to make
two kinds of mistakes, both of which increase litigation. Unsure of what the
law permits or forbids, people may violate the law unintentionally; likewise,
unsure whether a particular practice is legal or illegal, people may erroneously
bring suit against lawful practices. Perhaps nowhere is this phenomenon more
evident than in the area of religion in the public schools, the very domain of
Scalia's "Lemon test" monster.26 Caught in the whipsaw of the Free Exercise

25. See George J. Stigler and Gary S.Becker, De Gustibus Non EstDisputandum,67
ECON. REv. 76, 81-83 (1977) (suggesting that stability in behavior often attributed to
"custom" or "tradition" can actually be explained in terms of "economizing on information").

A.

26. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
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Clause's demands and the Establishment Clause's prohibitions, school boards
and school administrators proceed with much trepidation, correctly predicting
that virtually any action (or inaction) they choose may spawn a lawsuit. Thus,
clarity and predictability injudicial opinions may further institutional interests
by reducing litigation. They may also enhance institutional legitimacy by
quelling public criticism.
Another factor is judges' deeply internalized commitment to the concept
of "the law" as an entity separate from their own preferences. There are
compelling psychological reasons why judges would wish to remove their
decisionmaking one step away from their own preferences, quite apart from the
public appearance of legitimacy. In this manner, "the law" can be blamed for
compelling an unsettling result, while the judge divests herself of personal
responsibility for any resulting unfairness.27 In emphasizing her compunction
over following "the law," the judge may even hint that were the decision truly
up to her (which it is not), things might have gone differently. This tactic is
used by the magistrate in J. M. Coetzee's novel, Waitingfor the Barbarians,
when he sentences a peasant who deserted the army to visit his family after
being conscripted into service for stealing chickens:
"We cannot just do as we wish," I lectured him. "We are all
subject to the law, which is greater than any of us. The
magistrate who sent you here, I myself, you-we are all
subject to the law." He looked at me with dull eyes, waiting
to hear the punishment, his two stolid escorts behind him, his
hands manacled behind his back ....
"[W]e live in a world of
laws," I said to my poor prisoner, "a world of the secondbest. There is nothing we can do about that. We are fallen
creatures. All we can do is to uphold the laws, all of us,
without allowing the memory ofjustice to fade."2'
Chief Justice Truepenny takes a similar tack in Lon Fuller's The Case of
the Speluncean Explorers.29 Truepenny asserts that he has no choice but to
uphold the conviction of the men who killed and ate one of their party to avoid
starvation, after being trapped for many days in a cave with no prospect of
imminent rescue: "This [murder] statute permits of no exception applicable to
this case, however our sympathies may incline us to make allowance for the
tragic situation in which these men found themselves."3
27. Robert Cover terms this impulse the "judicial can't." ROBERTM. COVER, JUSTICE
ACCUSED 122-23 (1975), cited and discussedin Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85
MICH. L. REv. 1574, 1590-91 (1987).
28. J.M. COETEE, WAITING FOR THE BARBARIANS 138-39 (Penguin Books 1982)
(1980).
29. Lon L. Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV.L. REV. 616
(1949).
30. Id. at 619.
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In such instances, the outcome may appear to be a foregone conclusion,
and the decisionmaking process a purely mechanical one. Yet a judge's
asserted inability to decide a case in any manner other than the manner in
which she is in fact deciding it demands further scrutiny. The decision that one
"has no choice" in a given situation is nonetheless a decision. A pattern of
inconsistency in making this antecedent decision (i.e., whether or not one "has
a choice" to depart from the applicable rule) or in the results that are
"compelled" by a given rule, would evidence a greater role for discretion than
the rhetoric would suggest. Of such stuff monsters are made.
Particularly troublesome are situations, common in constitutional law, in
which the applicable text provides little or no guidance. In such instances,
judges must concoct rules which constrain their own future choices without
removing discretion they might legitimately wish to exercise in the future. This
dilemma finds analogues in the literature on precommitment and self control,
where, in Ulysses-like fashion, rational actors take advance precautions to
constrain the choices available to their own future selves.3' Through judgemade doctrines, courts tie themselves (and future judges) to the mast, but do so
with knots loose enough to be easily undone in an appropriate case. Thus the
courts may create doctrines that "bind" them to reach a particular result in a
certain type of case, while finding themselves at liberty to ignore or break those
constraints given sufficiently compelling facts.
The simultaneous wish to constrain choices while allowing oneself
discretion in a sufficiently weighty future instance is not in itselfmonstrous. In
fact, Jon Elster has argued that this approach is employed only by those at the
apex of ethical life:
The lowest form of ethical life is presumably total and
myopic impulsiveness. At a higher level is the life according
to self-imposed rules or strategies of precommitment; and at
the very highest level the deliberate breach of these rules
when, all things considered, this seems justified.32
This might suggest that the monster metaphor is unfair and misleading. Are the
judges accused of creating monsters merely operating at a higher and more
enlightened level? Quite possibly, this is the case some of the time. But the
intuition that there is such a thing as a judicial monster remains. What, if
anything, distinguishes appropriatejudicial discretion, appropriately applied to
3 1. See, e.g., JON ELSTER,
IRRATIONALITY

ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND

36 (rev. ed. 1984). In The Odyssey, Ulysses orders his men (whose ears he has

stopped up with wax) to tie him to the mast of the ship as they approach the domain of the
Sirens. To foreclose any possibility that he will be allowed to exercise his expected future
preference, he specifically instructs the men to "tighten and add to my bonds" if he should beg
them to release him. HOMER, THE ODYSSEY Book XII (E. V. Rieu trans., Penguin Books 1946)
(n.d.), quoted in ELsTER, supra at 36.
32. ELSTER, supra note 31, at 107.
Published by Scholar Commons, 1999
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self-imposed judicial rules, from more insidious forms of monster-making?
An example of the way precommitment is used by individuals may be
helpful. Imagine a person is going on a long journey by automobile and, upon
departure, is given a large packet of double-chocolate brownies by an indulgent
relative. The traveler has a meta-preference for not consuming fattening food
items such as brownies, but knows that as her journey progresses she will
develop a short-term preference for consuming the brownies. A crude
precommitment strategy might involve hiding the offending brownies within
easy reach (say, in the glove compartment) and promising oneself that the
brownies will only be "found" in the event one "really wants" to eat them. This
is tying oneself to the mast with thin twine indeed. A more meaningful
precommitment strategy would involve discarding the brownies altogether; this
would allow no instances in which the "no brownie" rule could be broken.
Between these two extremes, one might adopt intermediate strategies such as
putting the brownies in the trunk (so that a full stop would be necessary to
retrieve them) or having a friend hide them somewhere within the many parcels
and bags in the car. Such intermediate strategies might be devised to permit one
to exercise a preference for consuming the brownies only when factors are
present which legitimately override the "no brownie" rule. For example, the car
might break down in a remote area necessitating a long walk or a long wait, or
our traveler might become fatigued and legitimately need nourishment during
the course of her journey.3 3
The difficulty inheres in the fact that the person who must decide whether
a sufficient reason for breaking the rule exists is the same person who resorted
to the precommitment strategy in the first place, precisely because she
recognized her own inability to make good decisions about when to break the
rule.34 The secret to a good precornmitment strategy, then, is to erect barriers
to violating a rule which are sufficiently high that overcoming them to break
the rule will only be "worth it" when a truly compelling reason exists. In other
words, the person sets the "price" of breaking the rule (the lost time in
searching for the brownies, for example) higher than the benefit that one would
derive out of eating the brownies under ordinary circumstances. This price will,
however, be incurred in extraordinary circumstances in which the benefit from
eating the brownies is greater than the self-imposed costs of finding them.

33. The inspiration for this example was a passage in the novel GoodBenito, in which
the protagonist's mother orders a household employee to hide desserts and then berates the
employee when the cakes and pies are hidden "too well" or "not well enough." ALAN LIGHITMAN,
GOOD BENITO 34-35 (1994).
34. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL
EXAMINATIONOFRULE-BASEDDECISION-MAKJNGINLAWANDINLIF 98 (1991) (observing that,
"if the designer of a decision-making environment is guided by a concern that certain decisionmakers not make certain kinds ofdecisions, it appears psychologically counterintuitive (although
not logically inconceivable) to authorize decision-makers to determine in each case whether this
is the kind of decision with respect to which they should not be trusted.").
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In the judicial context, what is needed is some means of distinguishing
between discretion that represents a legitimate departure from the rules for
compelling reasons, and that which represents an illegitimate departure for lessthan-compelling reasons. The monster metaphor suggests the ascendency of an
illegitimate exercise of discretion that is fundamentally incompatible with the
purposes for which the putatively constraining doctrine was created.
Moreover, the image suggests that the doctrine is itself so misshapen that it
invites exercises of illegitimate discretion. When a judge-made doctrine,
however well-intentioned its conception, becomes so unpredictable that it does
nothing more than conceal the exercise of judicial preferences, a monster has
been created. Thus, the monster represents the exercise of unrestrained
preferences from behind the mask of a doctrine that places only imaginary
constraints on the judicial function.
It is easy to see that such unbridled yet disguised discretion is problematic,
and that avoidance of this monster is a valid concern for judges, lawyers, and
litigants. But the monster of unbridled discretion is not the only nightmare
image that judges must avoid. John Noonan argues that there are actually two
types of monsters, one stemming from "[a]bandonment of rules" and the other
from "neglect of persons."35 This second jurisprudential danger can be
conceptualized by reference to a horrifically consistentmonster-the machine.
B. The Machine
Rochin v. California is memorable primarily for the gut-wrenching facts
that triggered the unprecedented application of the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause to a search and seizure situation. 7 The evidence at issue
in the case was retrieved by forcing a tube into the suspect's stomach against
his will and infusing an emetic solution which induced vomiting. In a strongly
worded majority opinion, Justice Frankfurter condemns the actions of the
arresting officers:
This is conduct that shocks the conscience. Illegally breaking
into the privacy of the petitioner, the struggle to open his
mouth and remove what was there, the forcible extraction of
his stomach's contents-this course of proceeding by agents
of government to obtain evidence is bound to offend even
hardened sensibilities. They are methods too close to the rack
and the screw to permit of constitutional differentiation.38

35. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAw 18-19 (1976).
36. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
37. At the time Rochin was decided, the Fourth Amendment had not yet been held to
constrain searches and seizures by state officials. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949),
overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-55 (1961).
38. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172.
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Frankfurter goes on to reject a mechanical view of "due process." While
denying that the Due Process Clause permits "judicial caprice" or the
indulgence of "fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism,"39 he even
more vehemently disavows a stilted and mechanical view of the clause that
would allow judges to shrink from the exercise of judgment in appropriate
cases:

To believe that this judicial exercise of judgment could be
avoided by freezing "due process of law" at some fixed stage
of time or thought is to suggest that the most important aspect
of constitutional adjudication is a function for inanimate
machines and not for judges, for whom the independence
safeguarded by Article 1H of the Constitution was designed
and who are presumably guided by established standards of
judicial behavior. Even cybernetics has not yet made that
haughty claim.'
Machines, presumably, do not have consciences that are vulnerable to shocks
of any kind. Perhaps for this reason, they have historically been the object of
anxiety and fear.41

By evoking the nightmarish image of constitutional adjudication by
inanimate machine, Frankfurter effectively underscores the uniquely human
role of the judge. The human factor is particularly important, Frankfurter
suggests, when "dealing not with the machinery of government but with human
rights" in an area unencumbered by "formal exactitude."'42 It is not merely
coincidental thatthe "machine" image inRochin was juxtaposed against images
of the most visceral of bodily functions. The facts of the case remind us that
human beings are flesh andblood creatures, not mere abstractions or equations,
and as such demand an appropriately human judicial response.43

39. Id.
40. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 171. But see HANS VAN DE BRAAK, THE PROMETHEUS
COMPLEX: MAN'S OBSESSION WITH SUPERIOR TECHNOLOGY 89-92 (1995) (discussing the claim
that a complete human consciousness could be "downloaded").
41. See EDWARD TENNER, WHY THINGS BITE BACK: TECHNOLOGY AND THE REVENGE
OF UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 10 (1996) (noting that "[flrom the earliest days ofthe industrial
age, the greatest artists and writers of the West have had their eyes on the recalcitrant and even
malevolent machine").
42. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 169.
43. Similarly, in Green v. United States, Justice Frankfurter again uses an organic
image--"that which has been deemed part of the bone and sinew of the law"--to justify
following precedent while simultaneously asserting that "[d]ecision-making is not a mechanical
process." 356 U.S. 165, 193 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), overruled in part on other
grounds by Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968). The organic and the mechanical are
recurrent, and often opposing, images in law. See Lawrence H. Tribe, The Idea of the
Constitution:AMetaphor-morphosis,37J.LEGALEDUC.170,171 (1987); cf.Note, Organicand
MechanicalMetaphors in Late Eighteenth-CenturyAmerican PoliticalThought, 110 HARV. L.
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The Rochin opinion recognizes "that hypothetical situations can be
conjured up" that might call for a different result, but the majority finds such
speculative risks overwhelmed by the compelling facts of the case." Here
again, the idea that judges are human beings rather than machines is relevant.
When a judge rules on a given case, she does not merely replace one cog or
gear with another of a more suitable gauge and then walk away. When a new
case arises presenting different factors, a human being will be there, awake at
the switch, ready to make the appropriate adjustments to reach the appropriate
result.
The idea that judges are more than mere machines and that judicial
doctrines are not purely mechanical has been repeated numerous times in
judicial opinions. 4- As Rochin demonstrates, mechanical justice is resisted
even-and perhaps especially-when the rule in question flows from ajudgemade doctrine. Frankfurter's frequently cited admonition regarding the
operation of precedent asserts that "staredecisis is a principle of policy and not
a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision, however recent and
questionable, -when such adherence involves collision with a prior doctrine
more embracing in its scope, intrinsically sounder, and verified by
experience."' 6
These repeated protestations against the mechanization ofjustice respond

REV. 1832, 1839-49 (1997) (suggesting that "organic and mechanical metaphors coexisted and
intertwined with each other in the founding generation's political thought").
44. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 174.
45. See, e.g., Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467,484 (1986) ("The ultimate
decision... should not be made solely by mechanical application of [precedential] factors, but
should also be guided by the [underlying] policies .... "); First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para
el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 633 (1983) ("Our decision today announces no
mechanical formula for determining the circumstances under which the normally separate
juridical status of a government instrumentality is to be disregarded."); Arkansas Elec. Coop. v.
Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 375, 390-93 (1983) (rejecting the "mechanical test set
out in Attleboro" in favor of a "balance-of-interests" test) (referring to Public Util. Comm'n v.
Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83 (1927)); Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 16 (1983) ("ETihe decision whether to dismiss a federal action because
of parallel state-court litigation does not rest on a mechanical checklist, but on a careful
balancing of the important factors.. . ."); Arkansas La. Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 608
(1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court's decision today is founded on nothing more than
the mechanical application to this case of principles developed in other contexts to serve other
purposes."); Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 462 (1973) ("This formulation, consistently
adhered to by this Court in subsequent decisions, abjures the application of any mechanical
formula by which to judge the propriety of declaring a mistrial . . . ."); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 281 n.11 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("[J]udgment concerning the 'political' nature
of even a controversy affecting the Nation's foreign affairs is not a simple mechanical
matter .. "); Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 332 U.S. 507, 512 (1947)
("Those merely mechanical considerations are no longer effective, if ever they were exclusively,
to determine for regulatory purposes the interstate or intrastate character of the continuous
movement and resulting sales we have here."); Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22, 31
(1922) (Holmes, J.) ("The Fourteenth Amendment, itself a historical product, did not destroy
history for the States and substitute mechanical compartments of law all exactly alike.").
46. Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940).

Published by Scholar Commons, 1999

13

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 51, Iss. 1 [1999], Art. 6
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51: 183

to a legitimate threat. In the West, the machine has been a central metaphor for
the world, and for the creatures and institutions within it, since at least the
eighteenth century.47 Attempts to apply the machine model to the law were
perhaps inevitable. Jerome Frank references "the insistent effort to achieve
predictability by the attempt to mechanize law, to reduce it to formulas in
which human beings are treated like identical mathematical entities."48 Roscoe
Pound speaks of"the futility of nineteenth-century attempts to make courts into
judicial slot machines."49 Nor are attempts to mechanize law a thing of the past,
as the recent work of the Federal Sentencing Commission demonstrates."0
Moreover, the influence of the metaphor of the machine lingers on in the guise
of what Michael Foley terms "the American cult of balance," which "can and
does provide a common frame of reference by which everything derives
meaning and value from the way it is physically related to everything else."5 '
If a machine can do the work of a judge (or if a judge's job is merely to
tend a set of machines in the manner of the drone-like workers in the movie
Metropolis2), then it matters little whether judges are intelligent or ignorant,
wise or foolish, fair or capricious. Any unique capacity for moral judgment that
a good judge brings to the job is worse than irrelevant. In fact, it could become
an occupational hazard if the dissonance between the judge's sense of justice
and the results of the "justice machine" are often radically at odds. 3 In any
event, the role of the judge would be trivialized under any pure "machine"
model ofjustice. If the monster image represents the fear ofjudicial discretion
gone awry, the machine represents the complete lack ofjudicial discretion. The

47. See, e.g., MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD GO OF ITSELF: THE

CONSTITUTION INAMERICAN CULTURE 17 (1986) ("[The notion of a constitution as some sort of
machine or engine, had its origins in Newtonian science. Enlightened philosophers, such as
David Hume, liked to contemplate the world with all of its components as a great machine.");
RoscoE POUND, LAW AND MORALS 46 (2d ed. 1926) ("It was an eighteenth-century idea that a
body of enacted law might be made so complete and so perfect that the judge would have only
to select the exact precept made in advance for the case in hand, and then mechanically apply
it."); ROBERTL. SCHWARZ, METAPHORS AND ACTION SCHEMES: SOME THEMES ININTELLECTUAL

HISTORY 146 (1997) ("It can be said immediately that the Mechanism metaphor became the
dominant one of the age, lasting until the present century.").
48. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 118 (1930).
49. POUND, supranote 47, at 55. Despite his aversion to "slot machine"justice, Pound
did believe that certain fields of law, such as property, offered no room for discretion. See id at
59 n.27, 71; FRANK, supra note 48, at 208-09 (arguing that Pound would endorse 'judicial slotmachines" in certain types of cases, with "the facts being inserted in one end of the machine and
the decision, through the use of mechanical logic, coming out at the other end.").
50. See discussion infra Part III.A at 207-210.
51. MICHAELFOLEY, LAWS, MENAND MACHINES: MODERN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT
AND THE APPEAL OFNEWTONIANMECHANICS 233 (1990); see also infra Part III.B.I (discussing
metaphor of scales).
52. METROPOLIS (Universum Film Aktiengesellschaft 1927).
53. Cf.LLEWELLYN, supranote 17, at 121 (maintaining that if ajudicial opinion
"were typically a chance result on the order of roulette or even tossing pennies, the lawyers
handling an appellate practice with success would little resemble those who do today, nor could
many appellate judges of personal integrity stay out of the asylum.").
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human element is suppressed entirely; the judge is reduced to the ministerial
role of feeding the facts of the case into the machine and helplessly awaiting
the result that is extruded from the other end.
The temptations in favor of creating something resembling a justice
"machine" are obvious. Machines have the advantage of producing consistent
results, and should therefore be capable of producing a highly predictable legal
regime. This predictability has ramifications for society at large. If properly
calibrated, a mechanistic approach should be capable of providing optimal
incentives (or deterrents), thereby influencing the behavior of the countless
people who may never become litigants.54

Moreover, one might think that machines would be highly efficient at
dispensing justice. This, of course, assumes that machines could be designed
in a manner capable of dispensing something that could properly be viewed as
"justice." The term "efficiency" implies more than raw speed; it assumes
suitability of the means to the specified ends. For example, it would be
nonsensical to say that flipping rapidly through a book is an efficient way to
read it; however, this might be an efficient way to achieve some other goal,
such as locating dog-eared pages or marginalia. Similarly, one might simply
say that machines can generate outcomes rapidly. Of course, drawing lots,
flipping coins, or awarding judgments to the taller of the two litigants would
also be expedient ways of generating outcomes. 5 It is perhaps significant that
two of the specific machines named to metaphorically reference a mechanical
style of jurisprudence are the slot machine and the "catch penny
contrivance"-machines designed to operate solely upon luck and trickery.56
Because machines operate impartially, they can theoretically avoid any
unfairness stemming from consideration of impermissible factors. Samuel
Butler, a nineteenth century satirical writer, pointed out precisely this
advantage ofmachines: "No evil passions, no jealously, no avarice, no impure
desires will disturb the serene might of those glorious creatures.""7 The

54. See CARDOZO,supra note 1, at 130 (noting the vast number ofpeople whose daily
actions are influenced by the law, but who never have occasion to "appeal to judges to mark the
boundaries between right and wrong.").
55. See SCHAuER, supra note 34, at 148 (noting that "efficiency could.., also be
served by a procedure that made decisions 'by the toss of a coin or the cast of a die."') (quoting
RIcHARD WASSERSTROM, THE JuDIcIAL DEcisioN 73).
56. Whitaker v. Coleman, 115 F.2d 305, 307 (5th Cir. 1940) (asserting that
"[s]ummary judgment procedure is not a catch penny contrivance to take unwary litigants into
its toils and deprive them of a trial, it is a liberal measure, liberally designed for arriving at the
truth."), quoted in McCormick v. Stowe Lumber Co., 356 S.W.2d 450,461-62 (Tex. Civ. App.
1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (Hughes, J., dissenting) (maintaining that "[t]he majority here creates
more than a 'catch penny contrivance.' It creates a judicial monster from whose clutches there
is no escape."); see also POUND, supra note 47, at 55 (rejecting slot machine image of law).
57. LEwis MuMFORD, 2 THE MYTH OF THE MACHINE: THE PENTAGON OF POWER 194

(1970) (quoting a letter from Samuel Butler to "The Press" in Christchurch, New Zealand
(1863)).
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philosophical difficulties with such a mechanical solution to judicial bias
should be obvious. Machines may be free of impermissible bias, but they also
lack wisdom, compassion, judgment, and a sense of justice. Once a particular
machine has been calibrated and fired up, it is merciless and indiscriminate in
its operations. Its gears and teeth perform the prescribed motions precisely and
completely, no matter what is inserted into it.
It is not difficult to design a system that will preclude consideration of
impermissible factors. The difficulty is in also avoiding the unintentional
exclusion of factors that are not only relevant, but vitally important. Imagine
a robotic paper shredder designed to seek out and shred any paper it finds
within a given space. The shredder works in an entirely nondiscriminatory
manner, ferreting out and shredding paper without regard to color, texture,
typeface, or size. However, it also cannot distinguish between scrap paper and
such items as currency, irreplaceable family photographs, or the only existing
copy of a work of great literature. Using such a machine to tidy up the clutter
in one's home or office would be unthinkable.
The problem is not a purely technical one. Installing ultra-sensitive sensors
into the shredder that could detect and refuse a specified list of items might be
some improvement, but it would not save a child's cherished drawing lying
forgotten in the bottom of a drawer, or the urgent, unexpected letter that was
just slipped through the mail slot. As H.L.A. Hart explains, the inability to
anticipate every factual contingency is a serious problem:
If the world in which we live were characterized only by a
finite number of features, and these together with all the
modes in which they could combine were known to us, then
provision could be made in advance for every possibility. We
could make rules, the application of which to particular cases
never called for a further choice. Everything could be known,
and for everything, since it could be known, something could
be done and specified in advance by rule. This would be a
world fit for "mechanical" jurisprudence.
Plainly this world is not our world ..
Hart seems to leave open the question of whether such "mechanical
jurisprudence" would be desirable, were it possible. This question has become
an increasingly relevant one. The number of legal rules-statutes, regulations,
and precisely worded judicial doctrines-has been expanding rapidly in recent
decades,59 edging us ever closer to a world in which every factual possibility
is anticipated in advance by some legal rule. Corresponding advances in
58. HART, supranote 18, at 125.
59. See, e.g., Robert C. Clark, JudicialDecisionmaldngand the Growth of the Law,
17 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 1 (1994) (commenting on the increased volume of judicial
decisionmaking).
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technology have made it feasible to catalogue and recall vast quantities of legal
rules; the same technology could presumably be used to match factual patterns
to existing rules and generate a result. Indeed, artificial intelligence systems
have already been developed to predict judicial outcomes for a given fact
pattern based on weighted factual similarities to previously decided cases.6"
Cardozo suggests an answer to the normative question when he criticizes
judges who rely on the mechanical application of precedent: "Their notion of
their duty is to match the colors of the case at hand against the colors of many
sample cases spread out upon their desk. The sample nearest in shade supplies
the applicable rule."6 ' Such an approach drains all vitality and life from the
work ofjudging. Cardozo's indictment of this conception ofjudging evokes the
organic and the biological: "[N]o system of living law can be evolved by such
a process." 62 A machine achieves consistency precisely because it does not
change or grow.
There is plainly more to judging than this. Joel Levin suggests as much
when he argues that no single computer program could replicate the judicial
process.63 Yet he adds a curious qualification: "[I]n stating that a computer
could not duplicate a judicial system, one should not imply that it necessarily
would always operate more poorly or achieve less satisfactory results."' 6 It is
unclear whether Levin is making the mundane observation that even a stopped
clock is right twice a day, or whether he is suggesting that a computer could be
a serious contender in dispensing justice. This is not an idle question. The
powerful computerized databases available today may already be helping to
shape judicial opinions, and it is not difficult to imagine a computer algorithm
capable of replicating Justice Cardozo's color-matching exercise.
Computerized legal databases are unbounded by the traditional doctrinal
categories around which hornbooks and other manual research tools are
organized, presenting the interesting and counterintuitive possibility that a
computerized judiciary might be more "activist" or "open-minded" than a
traditional bench. But as those familiar with computerized legal databases well
know, the ability to instantly access cases with factual or theoretical similarities

60. Two such "case-based expert systems" are Alan Tyree's FINDER and James
Popple's SHYSTER. Sue Fawcett, Case-BasedLegalReasoning(last modified Nov. 30, 1997)
<http://vw.gslis.utexas.edu/--suefaw/Casebased.html>; see alsoJAMES POPPLE, A PRAGMATIC
LEGAL EXPERTSYSTEM 40-41 (1996) (briefly describing the FINDER and SHYSTER systems).
The FINDER system contains an interesting safety mechanism that warns users to obtain advice
from a "human lawyer" when its two different predictive mechanisms generate different results.
Alan L. Tyree, FINDER:
An Expert System (ast modified Dec. 20, 1997)
<http://www.law.usyd.edu.au/-alantaulsa85.html>.
61. CARDOZO, supra note 1, at 20-21.
62. Id. at 20; see also id. at 20-21 ("If that were all there was to our calling, there
would be little of intellectual interest about it. The man who had the best card index of the cases
would also be the wisest judge.").
63. JOEL LEvIN, How JUDGES REASON: THE LOGIC OF ADJUDICATION 157 & n.51

(1992).
64. Id. at 157 n.51.
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to one's own presents both the promise of fresh analogies across subject areas
and the risk of unhelpful, faulty, or even laughable analogies. No matter how
uninhibited a judicial machine might be in shattering the traditional
compartmentalization of law, its lack of the uniquely human capacity for
creativity and judgment would make its brand of activism utterly untenable.
While one could indeed design "a random generator which linked all
possible signs in all possible ways" in an effort to replicate human creativity,
the sheer volume of unhelpful results would make such an invention useless.65
One might think of Borges's lonely librarian in The LibraryofBabel, trapped
in a vast library containing volumes with every possible combination of
letters.' While the collection necessarily includes every work of great
literature, history, theory, and science, the occupants of this library can search
for a lifetime without ever encountering a single coherent sentence. 7 Making
successful conceptual leaps across contexts requires a selective and cultivated
sensitivity to latent similarities between otherwise unconnected factual
scenarios, an ability to detect submerged judicial concerns in one case that echo
those found in another. Martha Nussbaum terms this capacity "to see one thing
in another, to see one thing as another" as "the metaphorical imagination."" It
has more in common with a literary sensibility than a mechanistic one.
Moreover, a computer would always generate suboptimal results if only for
the rather tautological reason that those results would be computer generated.
The damage done by automated justice transcends any substantive optimality
in outcomes; it inheres in the depersonalized treatment of individuals that is
implied by such a system. As a theoretical matter, it makes no difference
whether these depersonalized results are generated by a manual tool, such as
a chart or slide rule, rather than through the use of modem technology or
artificial intelligence-although the latter possibilities may seem to present a
more insidious threat. Of course, one might counter that if the substantive
65. S. Ryan Johansson, The Brain's Software: The NaturalLanguages and Poetic
Information Processing,in THE MACHINE AS METAPHORAND TOOL 9,40 n.49 (Hermann Haken
et al. eds., 1993); see also MUMFORD, supranote 57, at 191 ("Within its strict limits, a computer
can perform logical operations intelligently, and even, given a program that includes random
factors, can simulate 'creation,' but under no circumstances can it dream of a different mode of
organization than its own.").
66. JORGE LuIs BORGES, The Library ofBabel, in COLLECTED FICTIONS: JORGE Luis
BORGES 112 (Andrew Hurley trans., Viking 1998).
67. Id.
68. MARTHAC.NUSSBAUM,POETICJUSTICE: THELITERARYIMAGINATIONANDPUBLIC
LIFE 36 (1995) (discussing Dickens's novel Hard 7Tmes, in which the character Louisa "sees
shapes in the fire, endows perceived patterns with a significance that is not present in the bare
sense perception itself."). The ability to see past narrow doctrinal boundaries has long been a
valued skill in law. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Pathof Law (1897), in PRAGMATISM: A
READER 145, 164-65 (Louis Menand ed., 1997) (relating the story of ajustice of the peace who
summarily disposed of a suit for breaking a chum on the ground that he could find nothing in
the statute books about chums); see also Jay M. Feinman, The Jurisprudenceof Classification,
41 STAN. L. REv. 661, 662-63 (1989) (examining the "classification of legal doctrine" and
exploring the negative aspects of "thinking in categories").
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outcomes from a "justice machine" were really demonstrably better than those
generated by human judges, any accompanying depersonalization would
become irrelevant. One could argue that it is better to have depersonalized
justice than personalized injustice. Alternatively, one might argue that if the
only objection to a "justice machine" is the fact that its results are computergenerated, the problem could be solved by simply concealing the truth about
the judicial process. For example, distinguished-looking actors could be hired
to sit on the bench, nod thoughtfully, take notes, and sporadically issue
curmudgeonly admonitions as data presented by the litigants is captured by a
hidden computer that will actually determine the case's outcome. The judicial
process would become nothing but a form of ritualized theater.69
The problem with mechanized justice runs deeper than this, however.
Under a mechanical worldview all problems are seen as solvable, all rules as
perfectible, and all situations as classifiable. The judicial process, by design,
stands in fundamental opposition to such a worldview. Its very function is to
deal with the slippage, the messiness of life, the individual situations that defy
categorization, the rules that do not cut cleanly-with all the flesh-and-blood
problems that come before the court, one at a time, in all their humanity.0 As
Cardozo explains, "the serious business of the judge" takes place here, "when
the colors do not match, when the references in the index fail, when there is no
decisive precedent."'"
III. BETWEEN MONSTER AND MACHINE

A. Rules and Discretion
Neither the monster nor the machine provides a particularly attractive view
ofjurisprudence, yet each provides clues as to the appropriate way in which the
judicial function might be conceived. Judges desire to constrain their
choices-but not so much that they are prohibited from later changing their
minds in an appropriate case. They seek to separate their own preferences from
what "the law" requires, but do not view their own moral sensibilities as
completely irrelevant to deciding cases. They wish to operate pursuant to rules,
69. Some argue that the judicial process already resembles theater in some respects.
See, e.g., Milner S. Ball, The Play's the Thing: An UnscientificReflection on Courts Underthe
Rubric of Theater, 28 STAN. L. REv. 81, 82 (1975) (exploring the "notion that judicial
proceedings are themselves a type of theater").
70. See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, Postures of Judging: An Exploration of Judicial
Decisionmaking, 9 CARDozo STuD. L. & LITERATURE 173, 207 (1997) (describing law as "a
layered collage, pasted together in an often disorganized and ad hoc manner, unfolding before
us in ways we do not entirely understand and cannot completely foresee"); RogerJ. Traynor, The
Limits of JudicialCreativity,29 HASTINGS L.J. 1025, 1026 (1978) (observing that in deciding
cases,judges are confronted not with "a well-programmed, orderly parade," but with "fragments
from a circus on the loose, collared by anxious barkers for a motley procession across the line
of vision").
71. CARDOZO,supra note 1, at2l.
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but with room for judicial discretion.
The interplay between rules and discretion lies at the heart of the twin
dangers identified by the monster and machine metaphors. Yet it is difficult to
discern the contours of the space that lies between these two negative models
ofjurisprudence. One might question whether there is any space between them
at all. Inserting a measure of discretion into an otherwise mechanical model can
turn it into a kind of monster. Removing judicial discretion over whether and
when to apply a certain doctrine means that the doctrine will be applied
"mechanically." The tension is a familiar one. As H. L. A. Hart explains, all
legal systems have to navigate
between two social needs: the need for certain rules which
can, over great areas of conduct, safely be applied by private
individuals to themselves without fresh official guidance or
weighing up of social issues, and the need to leave open, for
later settlement by an informed, official choice, issues which
can only be properly appreciated and settled when they arise
in a concrete case.72
Frederick Schauer has similarly distinguished between particularistic and
rule-based decisionmaking, with the former requiring open resort to the unique
contextual mix involved in a given situation and the latter consciously
precluding the consideration of such situation-specific factors. 73 Echoes of the
conflict between these two approaches canbe heard inthe contemporary debate
between adherents ofan "economic" approach to law, wherein general rules are
formulated based on stock assumptions about human rationality, and those
urging a more empathetic style of judging that accounts for individually
contextualized "narratives." 74

72. HART, supra note 18, at 127.

73. SCHAUER, supranote 34, at 77-78; see also Edward E. Sampson, Social Change
andthe Contexts ofJustice Motivation,in THE JUSTICE MOTIVE INSOCIAL BEHAVIOR: ADAPTING
TO TIMES OF SCARCITY AND CHANGE 97, 113 (Melvin J. Lerner & Sally C. Lerner eds., 1981)
(contrasting particularism, which "emphasizes the embedded and contextual qualities ofhuman
life," with universalism, which attempts "to establish transsituational principles that are blind to
special contextual features"); Ronald A. Cass, Judging: Norms andlncentivesofRetrospective
Decision-Making,75 B.U.L.REV. 941,942 (1995) (distinguishing between accounts ofjudging
that focus on "systemic constraints" and those that emphasize the individual judge's
preferences); Solove, supra note 70, at 185 (discussing the tension between abstraction and
individuation in judging).
74. See, e.g., Paul J. Heald, Economics as One of the Humanities: An Ecumenical
Response to Weisberg, West, and White, 4 S.CAL. INTERDISC. L. J. 293, 295-97 (1995)
(discussing some criticisms of the economic legal theory in law and literature scholarship);
Robin West, EconomicMan and Literary Woman: One Contrast,39 MERCER L. REV. 867, 867
(1988) (contrasting the "economic man" from economic legal theory with the "literary person"
from literary legal analysis); cf. Thomas C. Grey, What Good is Legal Pragmatism?,in
PRAGMATISM IN LAW AND SOCIETY 9, 16-17 (Michael Brint & William Weaver eds., 1991)
(describing the schism between contextualism and instrumentalism in contemporary legal
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Rules are attractive in the legal context because they promise consistency
and predictability.7" This proposition fits with the notion of "rule of law,"
which assumes a set of knowable and enforceable legal standards, which will
be consistently applied.76 As Schauer explains, "Rules are necessarily sticky,
resisting current efforts to mould them to the needs of the instant. '77 In this
manner, they buffer society from rapid change and make life more liveable by
freeing individuals and societies from the burden of life experienced "as a
series of constant and unbounded choices. 7 8
Rules are, of course, relatively unhelpful when new or unanticipated
situations arise. Because they reflect the limited perspectives and imperfect
predictive capabilities of their makers, efforts to devise a comprehensive
system of rules to cover every conceivable situation have proved futile.79 Thus,

discretion of some sort seems unavoidable. Yet each exception or modification
chipped into a rule erodes its ability to perform its society-wide function of
influencing behavior. Because the primary impact of rules is invisible, whereas
the impact of applying or ignoring a rule in a given case is immediate and
evident, judges might be expected to systematically underestimate the risks
associated with eroding a rule. This result is but one manifestation of the
common psychological phenomenon whereby one's concern with the impact
on known and identifiable persons outstrips any concern about impacts on
persons that cannot be readily identified (even when the second group is far
larger).8" Ever more stringent rules might be devised to counteract this
tendency, yet a completely unbendable rule could be disastrous if a situation
occurred in which discretion was truly warranted.
Judges must also apply a set of meta-rules that specify a hierarchy ofrules
and indicate when certain rules are to be set aside.8' For example, one such
meta-rule might read: "A legislative rule must be followed except when it
comes into conflict with a constitutional rule." Another might be: "Follow
judge-made doctrines in constitutional matters unless doing so leaves
unredressed a situation which shocks one's conscience." Some of these metarules are tremendously open-textured and malleable. For example, in the area
of precedent, the meta-rule seems to be, approximately: "Follow precedent

thought).
75. GIDON GOTTLIEB,THE LOGIC OF CHOICE: AN INVESTIGATION OF THE CONCEPTS OF
RULE AND RATiONALnY 172 (1968).
76. See THOMAS C. GREY, THE WALLACE STEVENS CASE 89-90 (1991) (maintaining

that "any theory that denies the essential place ofrules, oforder, and of reason in law neither can
nor should have any hope of significant success").
77. SCHALIER, supra note 34, at 82.
78. Id. at231.
79. FRANK, supranote 48, at 186-87 (discussing the efforts ofFrederick the Great and
Napoleon to devise comprehensive legal codes).
80. See GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES AND THE LAW 6 (1985).
81. Cf JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE ECONOMICS AND THE ETHICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
ORDER 4-5 (1991) (describing "constitutional economics," which involves choosing the
constraints within which other choices will be made).
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unless you really want to depart from it."82
As the machine metaphor suggests, ajurisprudential model based solely on
strictly applied rules would be narrow and uninspiring. Including a meta-rule
that permits the interjection of discretion based on contextual factors seems
promising. But it is not self-evident exactly what such contextualization would
mean. One possibility would be the more empathetic style ofjudging urged by
scholars such as Lynne Henderson and Robin West.8 3 Richard Posner has
criticized such calls for empathetic judging, citing, inter alia, "the inherent
unpredictability ofajurisprudence of empathy" and the possibility of "negative
as well as positive empathy-the revulsion of contemplating a style of living
alien to the judges' own experiences."4 Schauer similarly suggests that the
preference ofsome feminist legal scholars forparticularistic and contextualized
(rather than rule-based) decisionmaking could backfire.85
There is indeed something initially puzzling about a plea for greater
judicial empathy from groups that have historically borne the brunt of societal
bias. Should not these groups applaud the removal of discretion (which, after
all, has mainly worked to their disadvantage) and seek refuge in the blind,
impartial application of rules? Despite the surface plausibility of such a
position, I believe the question must be answered in the negative. Rules are
merely devices for shifting choice either temporally or institutionally (or both)
from one group of fallible human beings to another. 86 Choice and the
concomitant opportunity for bias are not eliminated in a world in which rules
are strictly followed; instead, they are merely retroactively transferred to the
rulemaker.
While rules may appear to offer impartiality, they may contain embedded
assumptions that work to the disadvantage of individual litigants. Rules can
also be devised to perform an end-run around situations that would otherwise
demand the exercise of compassion. Guido Calabresi recounts Justice Black's
proposed solution to the problem of prior restraints on freedom of the press,
given that such restraints might prevent loss of American lives:
Justice Black drew a rather grisly conclusion. He believed
there ought to be an absolute rule forbidding any and all prior

82. See RICHARDA.PoSNERTHEPROBLEMSOFJURJSPRUDENCE455-56 (1990) (noting
that "Judges follow the previous decisions of their court when they agree with them or when they
deem legal stability more important in the circumstances than getting the law right.").
83. See, e.g., Henderson, supranote 27; WEST, supra note 3. But see Susan Bandes,
Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. CI. L. REv. 361, 365 (1996)
(concluding that emotions such as empathy are not "always helpful or appropriate in the legal
arena"); Cynthia V. Ward, A Kinder, GentlerLiberalism? Visions of Empathy in Feminist and
CommunitarianLiterature, 61 U. Ci. L. REv. 929, 931 (1994) (criticizing empathy as an
untenable theoretical approach).
84. POSNER, sulpra note 82, at 412.
85. SCHAuER, supranote 34, at 162 n.25.

86. Id. at 158-62.
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restraints on publications, and that such a rule should be
promulgated in a case where no lives were at stake. If that
were done and a situation involving lives ever came up, the
lives would be lost before the case got to court. The court
would never be in the situation of either openly and coldly
decreeing that a hundred people must die or limiting what
Black deemed the greater value-freedom of the press.

7

Where rules systematically disadvantage a particular group or dodge
responsibility for making choices about individual human lives, rule-following
may provide nothing more than an efficient means of enforcing a particular
moral error.
The rules applied by a court might be formulated by a legislature, an
administrative body, a higher court, a prior court, or even by a temporally
antecedent version of the same judge or panel ofjudges. In any event, there is
always some distance between the rulemaker and the judge deciding whether
to apply, bend, break, or ignore the rule. Theorists calling for greater empathy
in judging are apparently predicting that the interests of the historically
underrepresented will be better served by choices made by present-day judges
than by those made by any of the other possible rulemakers.
This may be a rational bet, on the whole. The judicial branch is particularly
well-suited to the hearing of individual stories, unlike a legislature, which must
deal in broad generalities.88 Moreover, one might hope that currently sitting
judges would be more enlightened and empathetic to a variety of special
concerns than judges of the past, if for no other reason than the fact that the
composition of the judiciary is slowly beginning to move a bit closer to that of
the population at large. A related argument is that judges have always
employed certain forms of empathy and antipathy in deciding cases, reacting
favorably to those features in a case with which they can easily identify and
which resonate with their own experiences, reacting unfavorably to those that
are alien.
Two recent fourth amendment cases, Minnesota v. Carter 9 and Knowles
v. Iowa,90 illustrate this point. These cases were decided by the Supreme Court
just one week apart, and Chief Justice Rehnquist authored both majority
opinions. Carter involved a fourth amendment claim asserted by two
individuals who were briefly present as guests in a third party's home for the

87. GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATnTUDES, AND THE LAW 16 (1985).
88. In practice, such a distinction may be illusory. Legislatures are often moved to
act by anecdotal evidence, and public choice theorists have suggested that legislative enactments
may be excessively responsive to the special interests of cohesive and motivated groups. See
DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION
12-37 (1991).
89. 119 S. Ct. 469 (1998).
90. 119 S. Ct. 484 (1998).
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sole purpose of bagging cocaine for resale.91 Refusing to extend the Fourth
Amendment protection previously accorded overnight guests in the homes of
others, the Court, in a 6 to 3 decision, held that the individuals bagging the
cocaine "had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the apartment" since they
were only there very briefly, were present for purely commercial reasons, and
had no other ties with the homeowner or the premises.'
The second of the cases, Knowles, asked whether the police, after properly
stopping a motorist for speeding and issuing him a citation may, on that basis
alone, conduct a full search of his car.93 The Court unanimously held that such
a "search incident to citation" is forbidden by the Fourth Amendment, relying
on such unsupported and empirically questionable assertions as "[t]he threat to
officer safety from issuing a traffic citation ...is a good deal less than in the
case of a custodial arrest," and "the possibility that an officer would stumble
onto evidence wholly unrelated to the speeding offense seems remote." 94
How is one to reconcile these two cases, issued by the Court in almost the
same breath? One explanation is simply that the two cases are unrelated
doctrinally-that one involves the interpretation of the "search incident to
arrest" exception to the warrant requirement, while the other involves an
assessment about the legitimate expectations of privacy. In a narrow, technical
sense, this is certainly true. Yet it seems quite possible that these disparate
results were not, in fact, pieced together through a painstaking process of
applying detailed analysis within these narrow doctrinal categories, but rather
were intuited whole from the life experiences of the Justices themselves.
Supreme Court Justices, automobile drivers themselves, can readily
identify with the privacy interests of automobile drivers generally. Neither they,
nor anyone they know, wishes to be searched based upon a simple traffic
infraction. Hence, such a search cannot be reasonable. In contrast, Supreme
Court Justices do not engage in any sort of business that involves entering and
spending time in other people's homes. It is likely that nobody in their social
circle engages in such a business. 95 Many tradesmen and service
people-plumbers, contractors, carpenters, consultants, real estate agents,
cleaning persons, and the like-regularly conduct business in other people's
homes, but the impact on these groups of people was not seriously considered.

91. Carter,119 S. Ct. at 471.
92. Id. at 474. In contrast, "five members of the Court would place under the Fourth
Amendment's shield, at least, 'almost all social guests."' Id. at 483 n.2 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting)
(quoting the concurring opinion of Justice Kennedy).
93. Knowles, 119 S. Ct. at 486.
94. Id. at 487-88.
95. The facts of the case were, of course, unsympathetic (the business in which the
defendant was engaging was that of packaging cocaine), but the Court's reasoning was broad
enoughto coveranyperson present in anotherperson's home solely forbusinesspurposes during
daylight hours. The fact that the activity was illegal was irrelevant to the analysis. See Carter,
119 S.Ct. at 483 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (citing the Solicitor General's position at oral
argument).
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One can only guess whether the result would have been different if doctors and
lawyers routinely made house calls.
My point is not to attack the specific results reached in these cases, but
only to suggest that neither of these cases was decided in an empathetic
vacuum. The ability or inability of ajudge to identify with a litigant's situation
may well be outcome-determinative. Calling attention to the already entrenched
role ofjudicial empathy might cause judges to strive for a more inclusive style
of empathy that encompasses lives unlike their own. In other words, because
empathy is already here to stay, one has nothing to lose by trying to broaden its
embrace.
Yet empathy has some serious limitations. With whom is one supposed to
empathize, for example, in a grisly murder case? The victim? The victim's
family? The murderer (who perhaps had an atrocious childhood)? The
murderer's family? Many corporate disputes lack any obvious human
protagonists with whose "story" one might engage, leaving one to empathize,
if at all, with anthropomorphized versions of the entities themselves. Matters
are complicated by the fact that a judge receives carefully edited and
imaginatively packaged versions of litigants' stories, which have been
consciously constructed to trigger certain empathetic reactions. It is easy to
imagine judicial empathy becoming monstrous under these conditions,
especially as institutionalized empathy meets with ever-slicker presentations
and higher and higher production values. At the limit, one might imagine
lawyers submitting feature-length films chronicling their clients' "stories" that
the judges would view while hooked up to an "empathometer" measuring the
direction and intensity of their feelings.96 This image is repugnant, at least in

part because the judicial office is supposed to elevate judges above emotional
manipulation. The rule of law requires judges to focus on the alignment, or
misalignment, between rules and behavior and not to base judgments on the
strength of their emotions. Nevertheless, the intuition that a wise and
compassionate judge is better than a bloodless rule technician suggests that
some role for discretion should remain and that context can and should matter.
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines offer an interesting case study. They
originated from a fear of judicial monsters: "Congress, in viewing the end
product of the former sentencing process, apparently concluded that a hydraheaded monster had evolved-bred from judicial discretion, or indiscretion,
and parole convolutions."'97 Yet in fending off judicial monsters, Congress
turned judges into machines, as some commentators argue: "[I]n the typical
case [under the Sentencing Guidelines], the judge is supposed to perform an

96. Films based on sensational cases, sometimes released while the cases are still
pending, may already be eroding the line between fact and fiction in the courtroom. See BARRY
R. SCHALLER, A VISION OF AMERICAN LAW: JUDGING LAW, LITERATURE, AND THE STORIES WE
TELL 148 (1997).

97. United States v. Franco, 691 F. Supp. 1036, 1042 (E.D. Ky. 1988) (citing S. REP.
No. 98-225, at 46-49 (1983), reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3229-32).
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automaton's function
by mechanically applying stark formulae set by a distant
8
administrator.,1

Sentencing under the Guidelines is drained of any individualized moral
force, and primarily involves the calculation of offense level and criminal
history scores using a set of detailed and technical instructions. The box
corresponding to the intersection of those two scores on a 258-box grid holds
the offender's fate." In fact, a software package developed by the Sentencing
Commission can calculate the appropriate sentencing range based upon
specified input factors." Upward and downward departures are permitted in
certain limited circumstances, but many factors, such as a defendant's personal
history and socio-economic background, must usually be excluded from the
calculus.' Thus, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines offer perhaps the closest
approximation to date ofa "justice machine." Although some tinkering with the
machinery still occurs, judges are largely foreclosed from exercising discretion
in response to individual situations.
These constraints become comprehensible if one views the Sentencing
Guidelines as "devices for the allocation of power" that are consciously
designed to achieve a certain level of "decision-maker disability."'0 2 The
volume and pitch of the judicial backlash against these Guidelines suggests that
this disabling of the judicial function was both recognized and unwelcome.0 3

98. KATE STITHANDJOsftA. CABRANES, FEAROFJUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES
IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 169 (1998); see also United States v. Dibiase, 687 F. Supp. 38,41 (D.

Conn. 1988) (Cabranes, J.) (stating that "forty-three districtjudges in the Second Circuit issued
a public statement (supported by the circuit judges of the Circuit) noting, inter alia,that the use
of mathematical values had reduced the discretion of the sentencing judge 'almost to the point
where the sentencing process could be performed by a computer or an accountant."').
99. See STTH & CABRANES, supra note 98, at 81-82 (discussing the moral and
symbolic importance of the human encounter between the sentencing judge and the defendant,
which is eliminated by the guidelines); id. at 3 (describing the sentencing grid).
100. The software system, known as ASSYST (Applied Sentencing System), is "a
rule-based expert system." Alan J. Rothman,DesktopLawyering:JudicialComputing's Winning
Appeal, 207 N.Y. L.J. No. 91, 4, (May 12, 1992). According to the United States Sentencing
Commission's website, the Commission has ceased updating and maintaining the software
because ofinformal surveys suggesting thattheprogram is not frequently used. ASSYST(visited
Oct. 19, 1999) <http://www.ussc.gov/assysthtm>.
101. STITH&CABRANES, supra note 97, at4 (asserting that "the judge's authority to
depart from the Guidelines is notable not because it offers opportunities to individualize a
criminal sentence, but because those opportunities are so limited").
102. SCHAUER, supra note 34, at 98.
103. See, e.g., United States v. Harrington, 947 F.2d 956, 964 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(Edwards, J., concurring) (observing that "like the emperor's new clothes, the Sentencing
Guidelines are a bit of a farce" and that "the Guidelines are rigid in formulation and, thus, often
produce harsh results that are patently unfair"); United States v. Dibiase, 687 F. Supp. 38,41 (D.
Conn. 1988) (citing a public statement issued by forty-three district judges criticizing the
Guidelines); Harriet Chiang, New Drug Law isBackfiring,Judges Say, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 25,
1989, at Al (describing how one judge wept in open court when faced with the necessity of
imposing a guidelines-mandated sentence).
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Nor can human choice, finally, be avoided. The disabling of one decisionmaker
implies the enabling of another. Discretion, displaced from the realm of
judging, is forced backwards onto those responsible for putting cases into the
system in the first place and for specifying the parameters under which they are
to be assessed.' And judges, of course, are not the only persons capable of
creating monsters. 0 s
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines offer one way-and perhaps a not
particularly satisfactory way--of coming to grips with the inherent tension
between rules and discretion or the universal and the particular. The particular
is essentially discarded in favor of the universal; discretion is displaced and
dampened by rules requiring mechanical application. Federal judges are turned
into sentencing machines, while prosecutors are granted a degree of discretion
that is arguably quite monstrous. Although the Sentencing Guidelines are
apparently here to stay, they usefully illuminate some of the key issues
involved in mediating between rules and discretion in judging.
As the monster and machine metaphors suggest, discretionary and rulesbased approaches to judging can each be dangerous in isolation. Yet both
approaches are indispensable to judging, and are not mutually exclusive.
Instead of quibbling over the relative merits of the worldviews and
philosophical positions that each approach suggests, legal theorists should
focus their efforts on arriving at a workable synthesis.0 6 In this spirit, Catharine
Wells has sought to unite "structured" and "contextual" models of

104. See United States v. Bethancurt, 692 F. Supp. 1427, 1435 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(stating that "[w]hile the judge would still pronounce the sentence, he would merely parrot a
decision already made by the prosecutor"); United States v. Brodie, 686 F. Supp. 941,946 (D.C.
Cir. 1988) (noting that "whether or not one agrees with the choices made by the Commission,
the fact is that the Commission did make choices, literally hundreds, nay, thousands of policy
choices in sentencing"); STITH& CABRANES, supra note 98, at 125 (arguing that, "the factors that

Congress and the Sentencing Commission have insisted be significant determinants of sentences

are themselves the product of choices---exercises of discretion, if you will-that may be as
arbitrary as any choice made by a judge unconstrained by statutory or regulatory sentencing
rules").

105. Administrative action has the potential to become monstrous as well. See New
York v. United States, 342 U.S. 882,884 (1951) (per curiam) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (asserting
that "unless we make the requirements for administrative action strict and demanding, expertise,

the strength of modem government, can become a monster which rules with no practical limits
on its discretion"), quoted in Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 167

(1962).

106. See GREY, supra note 76, at 89 (criticizing the "stereotyped oppositions" of
"Equity versus Strict Law: colored particularity versus colorless abstraction ... life versus
mechanism... and, perhaps the two master oppositions, warm versus cold and heart versus
head"). While Grey concedes that these oppositions offer legal humanists opportunities for
"some satisfying name-calling," he argues that their acceptance of such "stock dualisms" is
misguided. Id. "Strategically, to accept the separation of heart and head and align with the heart
in the ensuing party struggle is to relegate oneself to marginal, weekend, after-hours status-and
to losing." Id.
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jurisprudence, °7 and Anthony Kronman has urged a "bifocal" approach in
which the detachment associated with legal rules and the individualized
sympathy associated with discretion simultaneously provide close and distant
foci. ' 8 A workable integration of discretionary and rules-based approaches to
judging is critical to avoiding the twin dangers of monster and machine.
B. Two Models ofJudging
Before I consider how a workable integration of rules and discretion might
be achieved and conceptualized, two models of judging that have gained
currency in recent decades merit discussion. While these two models do not
begin to represent all of the ways in which judging has been conceived, I focus
on them because each appears to promise a successful mediation between the
need for rules and the need for discretion. The first model is that ofjudging as
balancing, which, as Anthony Kronman notes, has become the dominant mode
of deciding cases.' 0 9 The second is Ronald Dworkin's image of the judge as an
author in an ongoing "chain novel."" 0 As I will show, neither of these images
of judging actually succeeds in synthesizing rules-based and discretionary
decisionmaking.
1. BlindBalancing
No image of justice has been more longstanding and influential in our
society than that of the blindfolded goddess Themis, holding a set of scales.'
It is an old-fashioned set of scales, with two pans, each presumably
representing a side of the dispute. The idealized judicial exercise implicit in this

107. Catharine Wells, Situated Decisionmaking,63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1728, 1745
(1990).
108. ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 72-73 (1993). Efforts to mediate between rules and discretion date back to Aristotle.
See Solove, supra note 70, at 185 and sources cited therein, including MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM,
LovE's KNOWLEDGE: ESSAYS ON PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE 66-75, 99 (1990); see also
NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE, supra note 68, at 47 (maintaining that "it is not as if we have to
make a choice between the utilitarian vision and a collapse into mere sentimentality"); ROBIN
WEST, NARRATIVE, AUTHORITY AND LAW 426 (1993) (noting that both "rights talk" and stories
are essential to moral decisionmaking); Toni M. Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling,and the
Rule of Law: New Words, Old Wounds? 87 MICH.L. REv. 2099, 2126 (1989) (asserting that
"unguided emotion" is as much to be feared as "[floolish formalism").
109. See KRONMAN, supra note 107, at 348.
110. See DWORKIN, supra note 2, at 228.
111. See BOSMAJIAN, supra note 4, at 170; WEST, supra note 3, at 29. The image has
not gone uncriticized. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Feminismand the Language ofJudging,22 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 31,37 (1990) (arguing that this "image captures a fair amount of the power but not too
much of the anguish" ofjudging and contrasting it with the Nigerian "Lord ofJurisprudence,"
who is depicted with multiple knives embedded in his chest); infra note 116 (discussing criticism
of blindfold). In some images, Themis also holds a sword at her side, but the scales tend to
upstage this token of power.
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image goes something like this: As the judge hears the case, she places little
lead weights in the respective pans. All the while, she keeps her eyes covered
to avoid seeing the identity of the litigants or even the direction in which the
balance is tilted at any given moment. Only when the case has been fully
presented does she observe which pan holds the weightier load and declare that
the interests corresponding to that pan have outweighed those on the other side.
In explaining her decision in the opinion she must write, the judge must
describe this balancing process and its outcome by pointing to the factors that
were considered. In other words, she must tell the world which specific aspects
of the case caused her to place weights into one pan or the other. Only rarely
will she hint at the specific amount of weight associated with the various
factors or discuss how the balance might have been struck differently under
different facts. This sort of opinion---"the long and excessively footnoted
decision that moves, in a stiffly mechanical way, through a recitation of the
different factors bearing on the case at hand to the generally uninformative
conclusion that a balancing of them yields a certain result"--has become
standard today." 2 Yet do such opinions describe what judges actually do, or
even what they ought to do, when they decide a case?
At first blush, such a balancing approach appears to be a purely mechanical
model for judging." 3 The scales are a type of mechanical device designed to
convert physical inputs into an objectively observable outcome that the judge
is constrained to adopt as the holding of the case. Posner has questioned the
balancing metaphor on just such grounds:
It is unclear what exactly it means to "weigh" arguments and,
therefore, whether the process of decision in the face of
conflicting arguments can be conceived in mechanically
computational terms. Even if it can be, it is the wrong
approach for ajudge to follow. A person should not surrender
deeply held beliefs on the basis of a weak argument just
because he cannot at the14 moment find a stronger one in
defense of those beliefs."
Upon closer inspection, however, it becomes clear that the process is far from
mechanical. Thejudge must decide whether, and to what extent, various factors
should be "given weight. ' 15 This means that she not only has to decide when
a particular factual circumstance or argument justifies adding a weight, but she

112.

KRONMAN,

supra note 108, at 347.

113. See KLINCK, supra note 4, at 354-55 (noting that balancing imagery falsely
implies "that adjudication is a process of measuring, and that, like measurement, it can be
reasonably 'precise").
114. PosNER, supra note 82, at 124.
115. See VINING, supra note 2, at 161 (discussing the legal metaphor of "taking
factors into account and giving them weights").
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also must decide how heavy a weight to select and in which pan to place it. Yet
even this choice-enhanced calculus fails to describe how judges really decide
cases; nobody really believes that any judge remains blindfolded while loading
the pans and only removes the blindfold at the end of the exercise to observe
the result." 6
The use of balancing rhetoric typically aligns more closely with the
following exercise: A judge looks at the litigants, the situation, and the legal
arguments, sans blindfold. After making a point of ignoring certain factors that
she does not feel should enter into the decisionmaking process, she
impressionistically reaches a provisional result. She writes down all of the
reasons that support that decision, and then writes down all of the reasons that
would support the opposite result. She then considers-based on a variety of
factors, includingpersonal life experiences andprecedent-whether the reasons
supporting the provisional result seem, in general and taken as a whole,
sufficient to outweigh those on the other side of the dispute. If the answer is
negative, she either rethinks the provisional result, or makes an effort to
discover additional factors that would add weight to the provisional result.
This account of the judicial decisionmaking process is similar to the theory
ofjudging as ad hocjustification that was propounded by legal realists such as
Jerome Frank and Karl Llewellyn." 7 As Frank explains, it is unrealistic to
expect a judge-or any other human being-to reason forward from premises
to conclusions: "[I]t is fair to assume that the judge, merely by putting on the
judicial ermine, will not acquire so artificial a method of reasoning. Judicial
judgments, like other judgments, doubtless, in most cases, are worked out
backward from conclusions tentatively formulated.""' For Llewellyn, the
psychology of decisionmaking casts doubt upon the judicial opinion as an
accurate record of the decision process: "[T]he opinion, however well
reasoned, must either express the doubt, the choice, and the creation, or else fail
to show the actual process of deciding."" 9
Because everything is made commensurable under a balancing approach
and because virtually anything-social policy preferences, efficiency concerns,
personal observations about how the world works-can weigh in the balance,
almost any result is defensible, at least in the close cases that are of greatest
interest. Moreover, because the balancing takes place in a black box, there is
no way to disprove the result reached. Anthony Kronman has suggested that
the ability to hide behind a set of scales is attractive to the young judicial clerks

116. Perhaps this would not even be desirable. Stith and Cabranes, in their critique
of the Sentencing Guidelines, suggest that the blindfold should at least be raised at the
sentencing stage. STiTH & CABRANES, supra note 98, at 79. Robin West has gone further,
suggesting that an alternative image of caring-that of a wide-eyed and watchful
protector--should replace that of blindfolded justice. WEST, supra note 3, at 31-32.
117. See SCHAuER, supranote 34, at 191-92.
118. FRANK, supra note 48, at 101 (citing John Dewey, LogicalMethod and the Law,
10 CORNELL L. Q. 17, 20 (1924)).
119. LLEWELLYN, supra note 17, at 12.
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charged with penning opinions:
As a rhetorical device, therefore, the image of the balance-a
dominant image in the opinions of the Supreme Court and,
increasingly, of other appellate courts as well-is likely to be
particularly attractive to those who by virtue of their
inexperience feel unable to articulate the bases of their
judgments, or who simply lack confidence in them and are
therefore afraid to expose their own deliberations too
nakedly.
Like the use of complex multipart tests and similar
analytic schemes, to which it is in fact a perfect complement,
the rhetoric of balancing is thus a strategy of insecurity. 2 '
If the choice to add weights to one side or another ultimately depends on an
impressionistic view of the case, then the question of whether a particular
factual scenario invites identification or revulsion can be outcomedeterminative. The pans of the scale are broad enough to accommodate
personally held beliefs about psychology or social policy and are susceptible
even to the crude expedient of a judicial thumb.'
Rules, whether in the form of precedent or legislation, occupy an
ambiguous and precarious position within the balance model. At times ajudge
might rely on a particular rule in deciding whether, and how heavily, to weigh
various factors. At other times, the judge might decide that the rule itselfshould
be thrown into the balance. Because the balance model contains no meta-rules
for determining when and how legal rules will be used, it is fatally
indeterminate. Unlike an experiment that any scientist could replicate
employing standard laboratory techniques, a judicial outcome generated by
"balancing" uses no standardized weights or measures, follows no set
procedure, and offers no opportunity for verifying that the considerations on the
prevailing party's side were indeed weightier.
Moreover, the balancing model does not contemplate the existence of
external benchmarks against which to assess outcomes, nor does it attempt to
take seriously the individual stories of the litigants before the court. Only the
relative positions of the two sides of the scale have significance, and these
relative positions lie wholly within the control of the judge operating the scales.
Far from providing a principled way of bringing rules and discretion together,
the balance model seems to capture the worst of both worlds. Behind the facade
of scientific rationality and carefully calibrated judgment lies a brand of
discretion which is not only unchecked but uncheckable. One might even call

120. KRONMAN, supranote 108, at 349.
121. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 720 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(asserting that the Court's Fourth Amendment balancing has been performed with "thejudicial
thumb... planted firmly on the law enforcement side of the scales").
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it monstrous.
2. Seamless Storytelling
Ronald Dworkin has suggested that judges deciding difficult cases can be
likened to participants engaged in an exercise of progressive narration in which
each person musters her interpretational and authorial skills to add a chapter to
an ongoing novel, subject to the criterion of narrative coherence." In support
ofthis argument, Dworkin points out that in deciding a case, ajudge must look
back over similar past cases and "determine, according to his own judgment,
what the earlier decisions come to, what the point or theme of the practice so
far, taken as a whole, really is."'"
The analogy has some surface appeal. Judicial opinions, like legends
passed down by oral tradition, are marked by a great deal of repetition. Each
case recites fragments and formulations from past cases, as if in a refrain or
incantation, and then works rhetorically from what is known and solid to what
is yet unknown. The enterprise involves a special kind of reading and a special
kind of writing. It is undisputed that interpretive and rhetorical techniques are
indispensable in doing the job well. But can a judge really be conceptualized
as a serial contributor to a novel? Can the corpus of decided case law be
likened to literary work with a coherent plot line and rational character
development?
Upon closer examination, it is apparent that Dworkin's "chain novelist"
formulation offers a dangerous metaphor for the work of judging. Underneath
such literary pretensions, his vision of judging really is nothing more than the
application (and possibly the extrapolation) of precedent, which the judgeauthors assume to be mechanically binding whenever and wherever it applies.
The key insight of the metaphor is that judges are not free to change the story
in medias res, though perhaps they must find creative ways to make the story
continue in an aesthetically appealing manner. Dworkin emphasizes that the
judge "must interpret what has gone before because he has a responsibility to
advance the enterprise in hand rather than strike out in some new direction of
his own."' 24 Ruling out "new directions" means that as the body of decided
case law grows larger and interstices are filled, the creative discretion of the
judge shrinks accordingly. Eventually, her role begins to resemble that of
Cardozo's judge, with a large card file of color swatches against which to
match the case at bar."z

122. DWORKIN, supra note 2, at 158-59; RONALD DWORKIN, LAW's EMPIRE 228-38
(1986). Criticisms of this model include Stanley Fish, Working on the Chain Gang:
Interpretationin Law andLiterature,60 TEx. L. REv. 551 (1982); Solove,supranote 70, at 17883, 207.
123. DWORKIN, supranote 2, at 159.

124. Id.
125. CARDOZO, supra note 1,at 20.
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Significantly, Dworkin's chain author judge has no duty-indeed no
license-to check the ongoing story against the realities of the outside world
or demand that the doctrines actually work out properly in consequentialist
terms. As in fiction, only the internal consistency of the piece itself matters.
There is no chance for moral outrage at a story gone awry, and no way to
abandon a story that no longer rings true. Errors are not only tolerated, they are
expanded, replicated, and applied innew and different settings. Dworkin does
suggest that the judge-novelist's mode of interpretation must include "a
doctrine of mistake" that can be used to overturn precedents or work around
incongruities in the law.'26 But this doctrine is subject only to the rule that each
interpretation must "fit" with prior law, which is itself defined by reference to
the canon. 27 Dworkin's conception of chain-novel judging does nothing to
avoid the results of judicial errors that are deep, pervasive, and clearly
articulated in prior law. The implications are not trivial ones. Consider the life
work ofa Dworkian "chain novelist"judge committed to faithfully interpreting
and carrying forward the "point or theme" of DredScott'28 or Plessy.29
Judges certainly do add their writings to those of other judges, but the
results, thankfully, do not approach the coherent novel Dworkin envisioned. In
fact, the chain novel could only be considered a viable description of
jurisprudence for someone who has never personally experienced the results of
such collaborative efforts. When I taught fiction writing classes (to
undergraduates and, separately, to middle-schoolers), I always included a
progressive narrative in the lesson plans. The students would have great fun
with the exercise, but the results were predictably incoherent. Indeed, one of
the purposes of such an exercise was to show the necessity of making global
decisions about a story-decisions as to point of view, main characters, tone,
style, major themes, plot line, and so on. When the various authors shared the
work by writing serially, the later authors often ignored or failed to recognize
the decisions earlier authors made regarding such matters. For example, one
talented young writer always wrote about penguins, regardless of the apparent
subject matter of the fragment she was given. This may have been the result of
selective perception rather than intentional usurpation of prior authorial
decisions. Within the interstices of plot and character left by the previous
writer, this author consistently saw opportunities for penguins.
Dworkin perhaps envisions that the judge-authors will, in practice, work
in a manner not materially distinguishable from my penguin-lover's technique.
He certainly suggests as much:

126. DWORKIN, supra note 2, at 161.
127. Id.
128. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857); cf. Solove, supra note
70, at 178-83 (arguing that a judge's interpretation of facts, as well as law, influence his
decisionmaking).
129. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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If a judge believes that the dominant purpose of a legal
system, the main goal it ought to serve, is economic, then he
will see in past accident decisions some strategy for reducing
the economic costs of accidents overall. Other judges, who
find any such picture of the law's function distasteful, will
discover no such strategy in history but only, perhaps, an
attempt to reinforce conventional morality of fault and
responsibility. 3
It is hard to see how such an open-ended view of interpretation-seeing only
what one wishes to see and then acting as if it were there-provides any rein
on judicial choice at all.' Dworkin responds to this criticism by suggesting
that a judge's sense of "integrity" or "coherence" will restrain choice.'32 But
integrity is in the eye of the beholder, and each worldview will appear to its
adherents to impose its own irrefutable coherence on the world.'33
The chain novel model for judging offers no workable method for
mediating between rules and discretion, context and principles, precedent and
empathy. If a judge takes the metaphor seriously, her decisions often will be
foregone conclusions. She cannot simply go back and change what has been
written, but must forge ahead for the sake of the story. On the other hand, if she
adopts a thoroughly creative approach to reconstructing past cases, she
relegates them to the status of horoscopes or fortune cookies, projecting into
them her own deeply held beliefs and aspirations. The chain novel would then
become a slippery document indeed, a paper chameleon taking on the colors
of the current judge-author.'34 In either case, the judge would be required to
keep her nose in the book at all times, whether as obedient scribe or renegade
revisionist. Absorbed in reading and writing, she would never lift her head to
observe how the system of law to which she is contributing actually works in

130. DWORKIN, supra note 2, at 162.
131. Cf. Fish, supra note 122 (explaining that "[a]Ithough the parameters of novel
practice mark the limits ofwhat anyone who is thinking within them can think to do, within those
limits they do not direct anyone to do this rather than that.").
132. Id. at 161.
133. Cf.STEvENPINKERHowTHEMINDWoRKs 525 (1997) (stating that"[a]ccording
to a saying, if you give a boy a hammer, the whole world becomes a nail. If you give a species
an elementary grasp of mechanics, biology, and psychology, the whole world becomes a
machine, ajungle, and a society.").
134. Such a judicial canon might come to resemble the "chaotic manuscripts"
described in Borges's short story, The Garden of ForkingPaths----"acontradictory jumble of
irresolute drafts." JORGE Luis BORGES, The Garden ofForkingPaths, in COLLECTED FICTIONS:
JORGE Luis BORGES 119, 124 (Andrew Hurley trans., Viking 1998). Some postmodern novels
make literary use of similar types of chaos. See, e.g., ITALo CALVINO, IF ON AWINTER'S NIGHT
ATRAVELER (William Weaver trans., Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 2d ed. 1981) (1979) (beginning
each chapter with a new narrative, as the protagonist is repeatedly thwarted in his efforts to read
a full manuscript); STEPHEN DIXON, INTERSTATE (1995) (presenting multiple, incompatible
versions of a random highway shooting, including one in which the shooting never took place).
However, the implications of such an approach in the legal context would be unsettling indeed.
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the real world.
IV. TOWARDS A PRAGMATIC VISION OF JURISPRUDENCE
If, as Robert Cover asserts, "legal interpretation is a form of practical
wisdom," then the judge's role is a fundamentally pragmatic one. 3 ' While
pragmatism has long been important to legal thought, it has recently been the
subject of renewed interest among legal theorists.'36 Pragmatism affirmatively
eschews overarching theories of all stripes, as Thomas Grey explains: "To the
request for an evaluative theory that can stand independently of practice and
rule over it, pragmatism answers with one of its core propositions: such
theories are not to be had."'37 Precisely for this reason, however, pragmatism
can mediate between competing legal theories-and the worldviews that they
represent-without taking sides.' 3 s Thus, pragmatism is the ideal vehicle for
synthesizing discretionary and rules-based models of jurisprudence. In this
final section of the essay, I begin to explore what a pragmatic approach to the
judicial function might look like, using the metaphors of the toolbox and
builder.
A. Unpackingthe Toolbox: Slide-Rules and Stories
At least part of what pragmatism means in the judicial context is an
expansion of the range of tools on hand for decisionmaking. Karl Llewellyn
emphasizes the importance to American jurisprudence of a well-stocked
toolbox: "[T]he court needs to have as tools at hand not a single one or even
three, but well-nigh the whole Croesus-wealth of our American authority
techniques to choose from. Neat cabinetmaking is both easier, more likely and
more reckonable when the workbench is well stocked."' 39 As this toolbox
metaphor suggests, a judge need not, and should not, choose between a rulesbased approach tojudging and a contextualized narrative approach. Nor should
she confine herself to using any particular theoretic template, such as law and
economics, law and literature, or critical legal studies. Instead, she should fill
her toolbox with all manner of conceptual tools and employ them in whatever

135. Cover, supra note 23, at 1610.
136. Pragmatism as formulated by thinkers such as John Dewey, William James, and
Charles Sanders Peirce clearly influenced legal realism, showing up in the work of Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Benjamin Cardozo, Jerome Frank, and Karl Llewellyn, among others. See
Richard A. Posner, WhatHas Pragmatismto Offer Law?, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1653, 1654 (1990).
For a sampling of contemporary views on pragmatism in the law, see generally PRAGMATISM IN
LAW AND SOCIErY (Michael Brint & William Weaver eds., 1991); Symposium, The Revival of
Pragmatism, 18 CARozo L. REV. I (1996).
137. GREY, supra note 76, at 106.
138. Grey, supra note 74, at 17 (observing that "today the legal pragmatist proposes
to the contending instrumentalist and contextualist schools: 'Good health to both yourhouses.').
139. LLEwELLYN, supra note 17, at 216-17.
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combinations are necessary to achieve a workable result given the contingent
circumstances at hand.
Perhaps the most important item in the toolbox is analogy, a meta-tool of
tremendous value in legal analysis and judging. 40 Like a power drill that can
be fitted with any number of bits and other attachments, analogy is the driving
force that activates innumerable other tools. Through analogical reasoning,
courts can not only creatively transplant ideas across doctrinal boundaries, but
they can also make use of the panoply of heuristics used in other disciplines,
such as economics, literature, psychology, sociology, and philosophy. Not
every attempt to transfer the methods and approaches of one discipline to
another will be successful, however. Moreover, the impulse to explain an entire
discipline by simply superimposing the template of another upon it is a
powerful but ultimately self-defeating one.' The best antidote is familiarity
with a broader range of disciplines, which will allow the most promising
crossovers to crowd out the more strained and unhelpful ones.
Here, I consider two tools that make use of this analogic facility by
borrowing insights from other disciplines, and examine how they might be used
together to achieve pragmatic results. The first of these tools is what I will term
the slide-rule. Despite the limitations inherent in rules, they can be structured
in a manner that renders them responsive to differences in situations, resulting
in something like a "slide-rule" or "sliding scale." Much important work in law
and economics has involved the development of finely calibrated rules
formulated as equations. These equations are designed to minimize the overall
social cost by solving for a certain value based upon other inputted values.
Such slide-rules can powerfully capture intuitions and may avoid at least some
of the poor "fit" often associated with rules generally.
Yet like all rules, slide-rules may contain assumptions that are simply
wrong, and they pose the danger of providing a chillingly efficient way of
replicating the error. They may also fail to take into account certain
important-possibly less tangible-variables, andmay not recognize applicable
constitutional and moral constraints. 42 Another difficulty is the tendency of

such rules to rely on a rather flat, two-dimensional view of rationality that does
not take seriously the complex motivations of individuals.'43 And, because the

140. See generallyCass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV.
741 (1993) (examining uses and limitations of analogy in legal reasoning).
141. Cf. NORTHROP FRYE, ANATOMY OF CRITIcIsM: FOUR ESSAYS 354 (1957)
(explaining that "[w]henever we construct a system of thought to unite earth with heaven, the

story of the Tower of Babel recurs: we discover that after all we can't quite make it, and that
what we have in the meantime is a plurality of languages.").
142. See ROBERT NOZiCK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 28-33 (1974) (discussing
the importance of moral "side constraints").
143. See, e.g., Amartya Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioural

Foundations of Economic Theory, Herbert Spencer Lecture delivered at Oxford University
(October 1976), in Philosophy and PublicAffairs 6, Summer 1977, at 317-44, reprinted and
revised in, CHOICE, WELFARE AND MEASUREMENT 84 (Harvard Univ. Press 1997).
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method itself makes all values commensurable, it may seem to neglect
personhood.'" Slide-rules, in short, embody both the promise and the risk of
the machine.
The second tool is that of the story or narrative, enthusiastically embraced
by law and literature scholars for its purported community-building and
empathy-enhancing powers. 4 ' Stories do indeed have tremendous potential to
add a dimension of richness to judicial reasoning. They can challenge, refine,
test, and discredit rules. Yet the very thing that makes stories so compelling can
also make them dangerous. For one thing, they may not be true. In the novel
Caleb Williams the protagonist, a fugitive who has been falsely accused,
receives the following piece of advice: "Make the best story you can for
yourself; true, if truth, as I hope, will serve your purpose; but, if not, the most
plausible and ingenious you can invent."" 6 The story may not be an accurate
factual account, or it may be untrue in a larger and more generalized sense. The
concerns that the story raises may not be genuine ones for these litigants or for
any other real litigants.
Another risk is simply that particular stories may be neither good nor
edifying. While law and literature scholars use great works of world literature
as models for the plight of the downtrodden, the lives of most litigants are
considerably more prosaic. Their stories may bear a closer relationship to a
pulp novel or a television miniseries than to the works of Kafka, Melville, or
Shakespeare, and a deeply empathetic look at their lives may yield only
boredom or disgust. A more insidious risk is that stories will foster or deepen
preconceived ways of thinking, or will intentionally play off biases or
prejudices. 47 Thus, while stories offer relief from an overly-formalistic
application of rules, they may pose dangers of their own.
Of course, both stories and rules are unavoidable parts of jurisprudence.
The case method is, by its very nature, bound up in individualized stories.
Moreover, both the operation of precedent and the general impact of judicial
decisions on the behavior of citizens mean that in the course of answering the
call of a particular story, a rule is also being made that will continue to have
vitality in the future. To test the contours of possible rules, the judge is asked

144. See MARGARET JANE RADrN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 201-02 (1996)
(discussing the risks associated with a tort rule that "would make the harm of various injuries
into a linear, algorithmic scale").
145. See WEST, supra note 107, at 424-25 and sources cited therein.
146. WILLIAM GODWIN, CALEB WILLIAMS 162-63 (David McKracken ed., Oxford
Univ. Press 1970) (1794).
147. See L.H. LaRue, Stories Versus Theories at the Cardozo Evidence Conference:
It's Just Another Metaphor to Me, 14 CARDozO L. REv. 121, 136 (1992) (noting that many
stories are told "to inculcate prejudice"). For example, the story concocted by Susan Smith to
cover up her murder of her two sons-that she had been carjacked by an African-American
man-was particularly offensive because it was designed to capitalize on community prejudices.
See Richard Grant, MotherofAll Crimes, THE INDEPENDENT (London), Feb. 25, 1995, at 16; see
alsoLaRue, supra,at 135 (responding to glowing accounts of the merits of stories by noting the
preponderance of various forms of meritless pulp fiction).
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to engage in an exercise of imaginary participation in the world as it might exist
after a particular decision is rendered.' 48 If the imagined world is not the kind
of place that the judge (or anyone else, for that matter) would want to live, then
the proposed decision must be rethought. It is in this imaginative exercise that
rules and stories work together synergistically.
Llewellyn explains that sometimes "hard cases make bad law" because of
a failure of imaginative projection: "[T]here has been application of a rule
without visualization of what that application will look like when made general,
when phrased as a subrule."' 49 A rule may not "work" if the application of the

rule would lead to consequences that would clash with the rule's purposes or
"with the purposes of other rules which belong to the system of rules which it
is the job of a court to apply."' 50 These conflicting consequences are rarely
present in full force in the case at bar; rather, something in the situation of the
litigant before the court hints at the scope of the conflict that might erupt were
the rule to be applied in the manner that is being suggested. This exercise is not
one of empathy or sympathy for the individual litigant, but rather an ability to
see in the litigant's situation a factor of broad significance. Not incidentally, the
reading and interpretation of literature involve this same ability to find
universal significance in a specific depiction.'
Llewellyn argues that the psychological process of decisionmaking in
difficult situations is "one either of sudden intuition-a leap to some result that
eased the tension; or else it was one of successive mental experiments as
imagination developed and passed in review various possibilities until one or
more turned up which had appeal."' s2 These "mental experiments" are used to
test the acceptability and the bounds of particular decisions. Robert Cover
describes the centrality of narrative-based counterfactuals to law:
Law may be viewed as a system of tension or a bridge
linking a concept of reality to an imagined alternative-that
is, as a connective between two states of affairs, both of
which can be represented in their normative significance only
through the devices of narrative. Thus, one constitutive
element of a nomos is the phenomenon George Steiner has
labeled "altemity": "the 'other than the case', the

148. The pragmatic method requires one "to trace out in the imagination the
conceivablepractical consequences" ofa particular concept. Charles Sanders Peirce,A Definition
of Pragmatism,in PRAGMATISM: A READER 56, 56 (Louis Menand ed., 1997); see William
James, What PragmatismMeans, in PRAGMATISM: A NEW NAME FOR SOME OLD WAYS OF
THINKING 45 (1907) (explaining that a pragmatic method for settling metaphysical disputes "is
to try to interpret each notion by tracing its respective practical consequences").
149. LLEWELLYN, supra note 17, at 274.
150. GOTTLIEB, supranote 75, at 112.
15 1. Cf.NELSON GOODMAN, WAYS OF WORLDMAKING 103 (1978) (noting that "'Don
Quixote', taken literally, applies to no one, but taken figuratively, applies to many of us").
152. LLEWELLYN, supra note 17, at 11.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol51/iss1/6

38

Fennell: Between Monster And Machine: Rethinking the Judicial Function

1999]

RETHINKING THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION

counterfactual propositions, images, shapes of will and
evasion with which we charge our mental being and by
means of which we build the changing, largely fictive milieu
for our somatic and our social existence." '
Literature offers a similar opportunity for the vicarious testing of various
scenarios."5 4 In a different fashion, economics attempts the same thing.
The use of counterfactuals and hypotheticals in law illustrates the
synergistic power of stories and rules. The development of rules requires the
making of assumptions about human choice and rationality, which in turn
requires the spinning of stories. Thus, a potential rule is tested by the stories it
generates. As new cases arise, rules must be rethought, not only in light of the
case that triggered the rethinking, but also in terms of their implications for the
stories of all the other people that would be impacted by the change.
To make use of slide-rules and stories in tandem requires ajudge equipped
with creativity, discretion, andjudgment. It is worth considering in some detail
how her work might be metaphorically conceived.
B. Building a Better Metaphor
Posner predicts that the changes in law brought about by pragmatism will
be "related not only to politics and economics and not only to the correction of
error, but also to new slogans, metaphors, imagery, and other means of
bringing about changes in perspective."'5 5 Not only do "[n]ew realities require
new metaphors," but old metaphors can become so entrenched as to resist
reexamination. s6 The impasse between rules-based and discretionary
approaches to jurisprudence, coupled with the inadequacy of present models
of judging, calls for precisely such a rethinking of the judicial function.
A metaphor emphasizes certain aspects of a phenomenon, bringing those
aspects into bold relief." 7 The selection of an appropriate metaphor for the

153. Robert M. Cover, Forward:Nomos andNarrative,97 HARV.L.REV. 4,9 (1983)
(footnote omitted) (quoting GEORGE STEINER, AFTER BABEL 222 (1975)).
154. PINKER, supra note 133, at 541 (discussing the work of Jerry Hobbs).
155. Posner, supra note 136, at 1669.
156. BOSMAJIAN, supra note 4, at 72; see 2 FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, On Truth and
Falsityin Their UltramoralSense, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE: EARLY
GREEK PHILOSOPHY 173, 180 (Oscar Levy ed., Maximilian A. Mtlgge trans., 1911), quoted in
Mark Johnson, Introduction: Metaphor in the Philosophical Tradition, in PHILOSOPHICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON METAPHOR 3, 16 (Mark Johnson ed., 1981) (stating that "metaphors... after
long usage seem to a nation fixed, canonic and binding").
157. See, e.g., ANNESHEPPARD, AESTHETICS: ANINTRODUCrIONTOTHEPHILOSOPHY
OF ART 122 (1987) (observing that "in thinking of life as a walking shadow, we concentrate on
certain aspects of life, walkers, and shadows to the exclusion ofothers"); Max Black, Metaphor,
in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON METAPHOR 63, 75 (Mark Johnson ed., 1981) (describing
metaphor as viewing "the night sky through a piece of heavily smoked glass on which certain
lines have been left clear").
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work done by judges in deciding cases is no trivial matter, because the aspects
that are emphasized by the metaphor will tend, in turn, to become emphasized
in life. Thus, attention must be paid to an issue that is often sidestepped in
analyzing metaphors--"the relative powers of different metaphors to work
good or ill in the world."'5 8 Viewed in this light, choosing the right metaphor
for thejudicial function is not merely an academic or aesthetic exercise-rather
it is a moral imperative.
What is needed is a metaphor for judging that will capture the day-to-day
work of a judge struggling to mediate between the call of stories and the
strictures of rules, the particular and the universal. An appropriate image of
judging should also facilitate
the building of a faith that the work can be done as it should
be done, that almost any right craftsman can indeed come
close to adequacy ...[and] that the ideal-picture is in fact
approached most of the time by many or most of his brethren,
even if not by himself.'"9
The metaphor that I believe comes closest to embodying this pragmatic,
craft-oriented approach is that of a builder. Unlike the balancing or chain novel
metaphors, which lack an external benchmark against which one can assess the
impacts of decisions, a building metaphor references a real-world framework
of interfacing structural elements. More importantly, it emphasizes the need for
the structure to function, to stand, to endure. It acknowledges the role of
precedent as a pre-existing structure upon which one might build,'60 but also
contemplates the potential need to remodel, expand, modify, and occasionally
even demolish sections ofthat structure. For apragmaticjudge, no foundational
structure, no single brick or wall is exempt from reexamination and possible
modification, but these structural elements cannot all be demolished
simultaneously.'6 ' As with a physical building, work must be done in a manner
that does not cause the whole structure to collapse. The reason is a practical
one: the law cannot simply shut down for repairs. Even as judges are in the act
of removing imperfections from the law, people are still looking to it for

158. WAYNE C. BooTH, THE COMPANY WE KEEP: ANETHicsOFFICTION 300 (1988).

159. LLEWELLYN, supra note 17, at 192.
160. See CARDozo, supranote 1, at 149 (asserting that "the labor ofjudges would be
increased almost to the breaking point if every past decision could be reopened in every case,
and one could not lay one's own course of bricks on the secure foundation of the courses laid
by others who had gone before him").
161. See Richard J.Bernstein, Pragmatism,Pluralism,and the Healing of Wounds,
in PRAGMATISM: A READER 382, 387 (Louis Menand ed., 1997) (stating although pragmatists
"can never call everything into question at once, nevertheless, there is no belief or thesis-no
matter how fundamental-that is not open to further interpretation and criticism"); cf.James,
supranote 148, at 101 (maintaining that "[tihe most violent revolutions in an individual's beliefs
leave most of his old order standing").
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guidance and protection.
The metaphor of judge as builder fits with the conception of law as a
practical craft, rather than as an art form guided solely by aesthetic standards. 62
This does not mean that aesthetics are utterly unimportant, only that they are
overshadowed by matters of function. Elegance in a legal doctrine (marked by
such characteristics as simplicity, clarity, and symmetry) is valuable; such a
doctrine is likely to have more staying power than a doctrine that is a hideous
cobbled-together hodgepodge, all other things being equal. But if the
hodgepodge, for all its ugliness, nevertheless has a valid claim to "fit," there
may be an appropriate degree of resistance to leveling it in favor of a more
elegant but less well-fitted model. 63
Builders, like judges, must work from a rather curious set of texts. Nelson
Goodman has commented on the special role filled by architectural plans,
which are designed by reference to their real-world potentiality: "The endproduct of architecture, unlike that of music, is not ephemeral; and the
notational language was developed in response rather to the need for
participation of many hands in construction."'" Likewise, legal texts are
designed to function coercively in the real world. They are not designed merely
to convey information or to edify their audience; they are designed to make
things happen. Like blueprints, however, legal texts can embody varying
degrees of clarity. And, like a builder faced with an ambiguous or unclear
blueprint, a judge must interpret the text in a manner that will prove workable
in the real world. If a staircase is drawn backwards or a gap is left between
floor and wall, the builder would be irresponsible to blithely build the thing as
drawn.
The building metaphor also encompasses the idea of imaginative
projection-the use ofhypotheticals and counterfactuals. The judge as builder
may sketch possibilities to see how each would look, or tack on a board and
then trim it down. She works her way around an issue until she has crafted
something that, more or less, fits the shape of the problem before her.
Constrained by caseloads and the uneven talents of the lawyers before her, she
may find it necessary in a later case to go back and reshape a comer, trim an
edge, or sand out an imperfection. This, too, is part of her job. Acknowledging
the need for such provisional measures is no disgrace. As Llewellyn explains:
[M]ere knowledge that gears do slip, that theories do need
constant help from the skilled hands, that baling wire and

162. POSNER, supra note 82, at 117 & n.23.
163. William James acknowledged the inelegance ofthe pragmatic method generally,
describing his "pluralistic empiricism" as "a turbid, muddled, gothic sort of an affair, without
a sweeping outline and with little pictorial nobility." WILLIAM JAMES, A PLURALISTIC UNIVERSE
26 (1977), quoted in Bernstein, supra note 161, at 389.
164. NELSON GOODMAN, LANGUAGES OF ART: AN APPROACH TO ATHEORY OF

SYMBOLS 220 (1968); see id. at 218-20.
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chewing gum are often the only means to save "the book" or
to save the game itself-this has never meant death, it has
instead meant life for any institution whose craftsmen still
had sap and feeling for their office.'
In fact, "a case law court which has lost contact with its tradition of ceaseless
minor retooling of the stock of rules" is in danger of creatingbad law from hard
cases.166

The toolbox metaphor suggests the plurality of approaches that may be
useful and emphasizes the utility of adding to the stock rather than selecting a
single tool such as a sledgehammer and using it in any and all situations.
Relatedly, a judge would need to develop meta-rules to govern the
circumstances and order in which various tools would be employed. When
different results can be reached through the use of different tools, the tool that
achieves the more workable result should be employed. I am using the term
"workable" here as a stand-in for the notion of efficient achievement of ends
within applicable constitutional and statutory constraints. The concept is akin
to utilitarianism, in that it involves an effort to reduce total social cost, but it
also incorporates a sensitivity to such factors as the practical effects of
departing from precedent and the societal impact of particular judicial
formulations and approaches. When choosing between two equally workable
approaches, the judge should select the one leading to more elegant results.
Simplicity, clarity, and clean lines are important in the law, though these values
should not be achieved at the expense of functionality.
Like a building, the law is a repository of history, a keeper of public
memory. In places you can see the old workmanship, which is sometimes
lovely and sometimes shameful. But the law is not a museum, and it is not a
church. It is a living structure in relentless, active use, constantly in need of
repair, and constantly under construction. Every day the boundaries are tested;
the walls get scuffed, and windows are sometimes broken. Every so often a bit
of flooring sags, or a section of roofing begins to leak, or daylight shows
through a gap where a corner does not quite meet. The structure is patched, or
plastered, or knocked out and redone, and later patched again if need be.
Surfaces are sanded or papered over, gaps are filled with caulk, uneven
foundations are shimmed. The place smells of paint and sawdust; the job is
never finished.
The judge makes the best job of it she can. Walking away is not an option,
and neither is starting over again from scratch. It would be a discouraging sort
of lifework, were it not for one thing: By and large, the structure works. People
live and work within it, depend upon its protection, and walk with relative
confidence upon its (mostly) solid floorboards. When difficulties arise, the

165.

LLEWELLYN, supra note

17, at 192.

166. Id. at 274.
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judge is there with a good set of tools and plenty of common sense. She does
not propel a homemade monster toward the trouble spot, nor does she pluck the
answer whole from a machine. Instead, she gets to the heart of the matter
herself, guided by what already exists, as well as by imaginative projections of
what might be. 167
V. CONCLUSION

The two nightmare images for judging-the monster and the
machine-provide rough caricatures of what is to be feared most in
jurisprudence. These images correspond to the problems presented by too much
or too little discretion, and mirror the conflicts among legal theorists as to
whether decisionmaking should rest on universal principles or contextualized
narratives. What is needed is a conception ofjudging that canblendrules-based
and particularistic approaches, using the tension between them synergistically.
Yet neither of the two images of judging that appear to offer the most promise
for mediating between rules and discretion provides a meaningful synthesis.
Pragmatism offers an attractive alternative paradigm that can be represented
metaphorically by the judge as a builder, making use of any and all available
tools to achieve a workable result. Perhaps the time has come for Themis to
trade in her rusting scales and threadbare blindfold for a hardhat and toolbox.

167. See John Dewey, The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy (1917), in
PRAGMATISM: AREADER219, 232 (Louis Menand ed., 1997) ("Faith in the power ofintelligence
to imagine a future which is the projection of the desirable in the present, and to invent the
instrumentalities of its realization, is our salvation.").
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